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ABSTRACT
Access control based on the verification of a person's identity is commonly used
in information system/computer installations. The most widely used mechanism for
access control to information systems is passwords. Passwords can be machine-generated
using a list of words stored in a memory bank, machine-generated using a sophisticated
algorithm to create a pseudo-random combination of characters or they can be user-
generated. User-generated passwords typically take on the characteristics of some type
of meaningful detail that is simple in structure and easy to remember.
Memorability and security pose a difficult trade-off in password generation. On one
hand a syste,i security administrator wants passwords that are unpredictable, frequently
changed and provide the greatest degree of system security achievable. Users, on the
other hand, want passwords that are simple and easy to remember. If passwords are
chosen to make them difficult to guess, they may become difficult to remember. When
they become difficult to remember they are likely to be written down. Once written
down a compromise to security occurs because users tend to store them in insecure
places.
This thesis looks at user-generated password characteristics. Of particular interest
is how password selection, memorability and predictability are affected by the number
of characters in a password, the importance and sensitivity of a users data. a users work
location, how a password was chosen, the frequency of changing a password and the
frequency of logging on to a system with a password.
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L INTRODUCTION
A. INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESOURCES PROTECTION
Concerns of information system managers include the security, privacy and integrity
of information system resources. With the advent of timesharing, networking, distributed
systems and an increased level of computer literacy, these concerns have grown
considerably. A dilemma in designing computer-based information systems that provide
a high degree of security is "How can we make systems that are easy to use but hard
to misuse" (Smith, 1987)?
Concern for data security will take different forms in different applications.
Individual users of computers may be concerned with personal privacy and wish to limit
access to private data files. Commercial organizations may seek to protect data related
to proprietary interest. Military agencies may be responsible for safeguarding data critical
to national security (Smith, 1987).
Systems without security controls are vulnerable to fraud, industrial espionage,
sabotage, alteration and disclosure. Statistical evidence indicates that most unauthorized
access attempts go unnoticed. One out of 100 computer crimes is detected, one out of
22,000 is prosecuted, 33 of these prosecutions leads to a conviction (Hagopian, 1987).
Absolute security is unattainable (Kochanski, 1989). However, there are layers of
security that when used in concert provide a high degree of system security. Physical
security, the outermost layer, is primarily concerned with preventing access to buildings,
terminal rooms and computer hardware (Durr and Gibbs, 1989). The inner layers of
security are concerned with logical security - the methods that cover control of access
to system resources and services (Durr and Gibbs, 1989).
Access control is requieIed at various levels. These levels include access to
buildings, terminal rooms, files and databases. At each level a certain degree of user
identification, authentication and authorization must be vetified. Normally physical
security devices are used at physical access points. For example, cards or keys are used
for entry into buildings and terminal rooms. However, other access mechanisms are
required to control access to files and data. Password systems are the first line of
defense that can prevent, deter and detect abusive acts to files and data (Wood, 1983).
They are one of the most cost-effective computer resource access control mechanisms
being widely used. However, through the years passwords were found to be lacking.
Passwords that yielded a high degree of system security were found to be difficult to
remember. Conversely, passwords that were easy to remember were found to yield a low
degree of system security (Barton and Barton, 1984).
A 1979 study by Morris and Thompson investigated the issues of password
security on a UNIX-based remotely accessed time sharing system. The study revealed
the compromise between extreme security and ease of use. Its findings suggested that
user-generated passwords are typically easy to guess because of their character length
(2-6 characters) and the method in which they were chosen (something meaningful to the
user). Passwords should be both easy to remember and difficult to guess. This trade off
is difficult to achieve.
Following Morris and Thompson's (1979) work, this thesis focuses on the
identifying the characteristics of user-generated passwords in the personal computer era.
Emphasis is placed on an extensive look into these characteristics and how they are
affected by variables that may influence password selection, memorability and
predictability.
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H. INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW
A. INFORMATION SECURITY: DEFINITION
Information security refers to the technological safeguards and managerial
procedures which can be applied to information systems hardware, software and data to
assure that organizational assets and individual privacy are protected (Hoffman, 1977).
Technological safeguards are implemented on hardware, software and communication
mediums; managerial safeguards include procedural controls, personnel controls and
management controls, all of which, when imbedded in an administrative framework,
ensure information system security (Ware, 1981).
Effective information system security requires the following steps (Hoffman, 1977):
1. risk analysis;
2. identifying and implementing required technical safeguards;
3. identifying and implementing required administrative safeguards;
4. periodic review of safeguards.
Risk analysis provides the basis for identifying required technical and administrative
safeguards for information system security. Since absolute security seems to be
unattainable (Kochanski, 1989), risk analysis produces a degree of security commensurate
with the information to be protected and with the amount of resources to be expended
(Hoffman, 1977). Pfleeger (1988) identifies six basic steps of risk analysis:
1. identify assets;
2. determine vuinerabilities:
3. estimate likelihood of exploitition,
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4. compute expected annual loss;
5. survey applicable controls and their costs;
6. project annual savings of controls.
The mix of technical and administrative safeguards are determined by the sensitivity
and importance of the information/data to be protected. The higher the sensitivity and
importance the greater the requirements are for effective technical and administrative
safeguards. Both safeguards, when used in concert, complement each other; one without
the other leads to insecure information system resources (Hoffman, 1977).
Computer based information systems consist of six categories of resources:
hardware, software, communication facilities, data, information and people. Each of these
resources may be the means by which a system is compromised. Periodic reviews of the
safeguards are required to ensure information system security. Reviews should be
conducted when new hardware or services are implemented, after a reorganization and
high personnel turnover. Spot reviews should also be conducted.
Two general approaches may be used in developing a security system: all resources
are protected or only critical resources are protected (Wood, 1983). Some information
managers emphasize the value of computer hardware rather than the value of the
information stored in the system (Wood, 1983). Information system security affects an
organization as a whole. For this reason, security has become a management issue.
Information is a key to any organization's success. Information stored in comtiputer-
based systems must be protected against accidental or intentional disclosure. f'aiud and
abuse. In order for information hitegrity to be maintained a certain degree of' security
and access control must be implemented system and organization wide. However.
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security creates accessibility problems. Security may threaten the survivability of an
organization if the trade-off between accessibility and protection of information resources
is not optimized. An information system with no accessibility is useless to an
organization, however, a system storing sensitive and vital information with no security
may render an organization useless if the information is accessed by the wrong people.
Most often, when security is implemented system users view it as restricting. No
longer can they access various databases without authorized access; no longer can they
enter controlled spaces to browse files and manipulate data. An organization is affected
in four ways by the implementation of information system security (Hagopian, 1987):
1. additional job responsibilities are assigned causing possible organizational friction;
2. the security system makes sign-on more difficult;
3. access to resources are restricted;
4. the choice of which terminal to use will be reduced.
B. JUSTIFICATION FOR INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY
As the use of information systems spreads so does the potential for abuse of
information systems. Abuse consists of intentional disclosure, fraud, espionage,
embezzlement, sabotage and larceny (Parker and Nycum, 1984). Although the number
of computer crimes increases as the use and complexity of computer systems grow, many
crimes go unnoticed, unreported and unprosecuted. One out of eight computer abuses
is detected (Hoffer and Straub, 1989). Of those detected 32% are discovered by
accident, 45% by normal system controls, eight percent by computer security officets and
4.5% by auditors (Hoffer and Stmaub. 1989). The cost of computer crile, iesilis in
significant monetary losses to miny organizations. In their study, Hoffer and Stmaub
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(1989) revealed 211 out of 1,211 firms reported 259 separate incidents of information
system abuse. Five firms reported more than $100,000 in losses, one reported a two
million dollar loss. Equity Funding Insurance suffered a $200 million loss due to fraud;
a $21 million bank embezzlement in Los Angeles, a $10 million funds transfer fraud in
Los Angeles, a $53 million security fraud in Florida and a $67 million inventory fraud
in New York, are record breaking cases of computer crimes (Parker and Nycum, 1974).
While some view information system security as an inconvenience and costly, one can
also appreciate that the cost of implementing a security system is minimal compared to
the cost of doing without it (Rash,1989).
Computer crimes result from systems resources being exposed either intentionally
or unintentionally to those not authorized access to them. Exposure represents possible
loss or harm while vulnerability is considered the weakness that might be exploited
(Pfleeger, 1989). Exposures increase as vulnerability increases; they both can occur in
the forms of disclosure, modification or destruction of information system resources
(Fisher, 1984). Hoffer and Straub (1989) identified five categories of exposure
1. unauthorized use of computer service;
2. disruption of computer service;
3. abuse to data;
4. abuse to programs;
5. abuse to hardware.
Exposures and vulnerabilities exist as a result of several factors some which act
alone while others act in combinatioii to cause catastrophic abusive acts. These 'tactors




The people threat is the major cause of exposure. The majority of the people
that create the people problem are application programmers, clerks, students, managers
and systems analysts (Hoffer and Straub, 1989). 90% of computer crimes is instigated
by insiders (Cooper, 1989). Many of these are people with special privileges, have
access to special information who fall into the categories of employees or ex-employees
and by virtue of their employment have a special measure of trust (Cooper, 1989).
Motivation -for abusing information systems fall into four categories (Cooper, 1989;
Hoffer and Straub, 1989; Ware, 1984):
1. personal gain (money) - 30%
2. ignorance of proper conduct - 27%
3. misguided playfulness - 21%
4. maliciousness - 12%.
2. Hardware
Hardware-related exposures may be caused by inadequate or incorrect
microcoding causing a legitimate request to yield unauthorized information.
3. Software
The use of software to reveal information is probably the second major cause
of exposures. During software development, a common practice is to implement specific
ways for a developer to quickly gain access to certain segments of a program. These
quick-entry mechanisms or "back doors" may not be completely eliminated befoie a
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program is released to users, allowing intruders to gain access to and modify original
code.
4. Communications
With the proliferation of personal computers and their ability to communicate
with other computer systems anywhere in the world, the complexity of communications
security is a significant problem. No longer can a security manager confidently establish
boundaries around a system. With the advent of networks, distributed systems and
technological advances in communications, remote access can be achieved from anywhere
through the use of a personal computer, a modem and a communications program.
5. Procedures
Procedures that have been poorly thought out can have detrimental effects.
Procedures are a form of an administrative safeguard employed to implement and
improve information system security. However, procedures that are poorly thought out,
with little management enforcement and involvement and fail to support organizational
goals and missions, will be easily circumvented, ignored and abused.
6. Acts of God
Acts of God include natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes
or fires and can result in the loss of facilities and data. Backup and recovery procedures
plus establishment of a geographically separated secondary facility can alleviate these
possibilities.
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C. METHODS OF DEFENSE
Protection of computer-based information systems start with commitment from an
organization. This commitment includes money and management enforcement of
established policies and regulations. Protection of computer-based information systems
may be thought of as a layered approach, resembling an onion. Layers of security
surround the resource that needs to be secured. Each layer insulates the subject and
makes it more difficult to access in any way other than those planned for (Durr and
Gibbs, 1989). Physical security is the outer layer, concerned with preventing access to
the hardware (Duff and Gibbs, 1989). The inner layers of security are concerned with
logical security - methods that cover control of access to the system resources and
services (Dufn and Gibbs, 1989). Each layer uses a different methodology to address
the problems unique to that particular layer. The synergism of multiple layers creates
a security system that protects its resources and services.
Hsiao (1979) delineates five types of defenses: operational security, physical
security, hardware security, cryptographic transformations and operating system security.
1. Operational Security
The broad category of operational security encompasses two major areas:
operating environment and authorization control (Hsiao, 1979).
a. Operating Environment.
An operating environment is defined in terms of the degree of access
allowed to a computer system. Three possibilities exist: closed, open or unlimited (I 1iao.
1979). In a closed system only a few users have access. In an open system, any peison
can gain access by identifying himself or herself personally to another person authorized
9
to grant access. In an unlimited environment, any person can gain access with little
effort.
b. Authorization Control.
Authority to grant access to a system can be divided into three categories:
centralized, hierarchial decentralized and individual (Hsiao, 1979). Under centralized
control, a person or department controls who is granted authorization. In hierarchial
decentralization, functional managers have the power to grant access for specific areas
under their control. The complete decentralization of control results in individual control:
an owner of information is responsible to control access to it. Authorization control or
authentication can take many forms from passwords to the confirmation of biological
traits. Various types of authorization control are discussed later in this paper.
2. Physical Security
Physical security encompasses acts of God, man-made disasters and intrusion
(Hsiao, 1979). Acts of God, such as fires and floods, may be controlled by installation
of sensors and automatic suppressant systems such as a HALON 1211 fire fighting
system. Man-made disasters or equipment failures such as a disk head crash can be
minimized through a backup and recovery system. Intrusion, either intentional or
unintentional, is a primary concern of physical security. Prior to the proliferation of
network communications systems, avoiding intrusion meant keeping a person from
physically entering a computer facility. With networks and distributed systems and the
current ability to access a computer through remote terminals, physical security 11Uts! iiom
be concerned with preventing access through communications media. Cipher locks.
identification cards and door monitors are examples of tools used for physical security.
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3. Hardware Security
Closely related to the design of hardware is the design of the hardware
security system. Various hardware components require protection from both the user and
computer applications or processes desiring to use the hardware resources. Examples of
tools used are special microchips called registers and operating system software.
4. Cryptographic Transformations
A different approach to security is the encoding of user access information.
The underlying assumption is that intruders will be able to gain access. Rather than try
to prevent access, emphasis is placed on encrypting or scrambling the data making it
unusable by outsiders (Hsiao, 1979). Data that can not be interpreted are of little value.
Tools commonly used are encryption and decryption algorithms.
5. Operating System Security
An operating system is the master program that controls the execution of all
other processes and stays resident in main memory. Prior to the running of an
application program, an operating system must be executed. An operating system acts
as the mediator between competing processes and allocates resources based on demands.
Gaining access to an operating system can lead to access of other programs.
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D. DEFENSE TOOLS
Two of the major defense tools used in computer security are authentication and
encryption (Wood, 1983).
1. Authentication
The most widely used defense tool is use of authentication methods.
Identification by authentication is approached in two ways: use of natural properties, such
as fingerprints, or use of artificial measures, such as passwords or magnetic cards (Ahituv
et al., 1987). Authentication methods use something known (a password), something
possessed (a personal key), something to be performed (a signature) or some biological
trait (a fingerprint) (Fisher, 1984).
The underlying logic of authentication devices takes two forms: make
computers more like people by equipping them with biometric readers or make people
more like computers by equipping them with personal computerized authentication devices
(Spender, 1987). Authentication devices take the form of biometrics, directly connected
token reading devices (keyholes which accept electronic keys), user interface tokens
(pocket devices that can generate one-time passwords) and fixed password devices (plastic
cards that contain access codes read electronically) (Spender, 1987).
2. Encryption
Encryption is the rendering of information unintelligible by effecting a series
of transformations through the use of variable elements (Wood, 1977). It is the process
of encoding a message so that the meaning of the message is not obvious (Pfleeger,
1988). Encryption can be applied to databases, files, system applications and passwords
used as authentication mechanism,. Encryption of passwords can be accomplished by
12
three methods: encrypting a password table stored in memory, using one-way encrypted
passwords and using a personal key device that contains an encrypted code after the plain
text password has been entered (Ahituv et al., 1987). The underlying objective of is to
make encryption easy and decryption difficult (Pfleeger, 1988). Encryption raises the
time and effort required to break a users encrypted password (Menkus, 1988).
Encryption and authentication are highly viable tools for defending against potential
intruders. Authentication can be achieved through the use of passwords. Passwords are
a cost-effective authentication and access control mechanism. With this background in
information system security, Chapter III explores the use of passwords as a security
mechanism.
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III. PASSWORDS AS A SECURITY MECHANISM
A. BACKGROUND
One of the most important aspects in a secure computer system is access control.
At the heart of access control is user identification (Avarne, 1988). The first step to
establishing the identity of a user is through authentication. Passwords are an identity
authenticator (Avarne, 1988; Porter, 1982).
1. Authentication vs Authorization
Verifying the identity of a user is a critical factor in establishing the first line
of defense of an information system. Authentication verifies that a person is who he or
she claims to be (Hoffnan, 1977; Menkus, 1988; Porter, 1982). Authentication falls into
three categories (Cooper, 1989; Menkus, 1988; Porter, 1982; Wood, 1977):
1. something possessed, e.g., card, key, special terminal;
2. something characteristic of person, e.g., biometrics, hand geometry, signature;
3. something known, e.g., password algorithm.
Clearly, authentication must take place to ensure proper identification of a system user
and to facilitate the enforcing of a system security.
Once authentication has been conducted, authorization of a given user to
access specific resources can be carried out. Authorization is defined as deternining
whether a person or object is legitimately entitled to a protected resource (Hoffilua.
1977). Both authentication and iutliorization are used together to ensure proper iccess
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control. Passwords, the most common authentication mechanism, provide a means for
controlling access to system resources.
2. Definition of Passwords
The use of passwords is one the oldest method of access control. Passwords
consist of a sequence of numbers, special symbols or control characters used to
authenticate a user's identity (Wood, 1983). They are mutually agreed upon code words
assumed to be known only by a user, a system and a system administrator. The risk of
granting access to an invalid user must be measured against the cost of designing,
implementing and maintaining an adequate security system. The advent of networks,
distributed systems and end-user computing brought computer resources out from under
the centrally protected facilities. A rudimentary password architecture became the answer
to the problem of protecting dispersed resources and controlling access to these resources.
Passwords offer the benefits of being relatively inexpensive, readily implementable and
supported by most operating systems (Spender, 1987). A fourth benefit of adopting a
password security system is familiarity. Passwords are a known methodology (Wood,
1977).
3. Objectives of Password Controls
The objective of a password is to authenticate a user of computer resources
(Wood, 1983). The underlying goal is to provide a password security system at minimal
inconvenience to users of a system (Morris and Thompson, 1979). As the first line of
defense, password controls should prevent unauthorized users from gaining acces, to a
system as well as preventing authorized users from engaging in activities for which they
have not received permission (N-1onis and Thompson, 1979; Wood, 1983). Simply put,
password systems should be designed to prevent, detect and deter (Wood, 1983).
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Password systems should be flexible, user-friendly, reliable, effective and secure (Cooper,
1989). However, a trade-off exists between user-friendliness and security. The user of
a password system wants an easy to remember password, an easy to use system and no
restrictions to resources. An organization wants sensitive and vital information protected
against espionage, modification and destruction. Protection of personal privacy,
proprietary interest, administrative confidentiality (Barton and Barton, 1984) and, in the
military, safeguarding data critical to national security (Smith, 1987) can be achieved
through passwords. The trade-off between ease of use (user-friendliness and flexibility)
and security (reliability and effectiveness) is directly applicable to passwords. Too much
emphasis placed on ease of use may hamper the degree of security provided, while too
much emphasis on security and controlling access may stifle organizational growth from
lack of access to sufficient information in a timely manner and create resentment to
toward use of the system. Although an optimum trade-off between users' interest and
organizational protection of sensitive resources is difficult to achieve, the critical objective
of a password security scheme is to establish that the system is interacting with the
person who is purported to be on the system and access to only authorized resources is
permitted (Wood, 1983).
B. TYPES OF PASSWORDS
Passwords are categorized by two methods: generation and use. Generation methods




System-generation of passwords is managed by a system security administrator
(Menkus, 1988). An administrator's responsibilities include selection of new passwords,
distribution of passwords, monitoring to ensure proper use of passwords and disposition
of expired passwords. System-generated passwords are normally generated either through
a random number generator or a nonsense string generator (Menkus, 1988).
The advantage of system-generated passwords is that a user is removed from
the selection process. User-generated passwords are normally connected with a user's
lifestyle. That makes them vulnerable to guessing by outsiders (Menkus, 1988). System-
generated passwords will normally contain random characters and are not related to a
user's lifestyle.
Disadvantages of system-generated passwords include difficulty in
remembering, possible repetition of generation cycles, vulnerability of storage tables and
the removal of a user from the selection process. Nonsensical strings of characters make
guessing difficult, but also make remembrance by a user difficult. Complicated
passwords tend to be forgotten or written down (Ahituv et al., 1987).
To combat this problem, some systems generate character strings that include
vowels, making the strings more pronounceable and therefore memorable. The tradeoff




User-generated passwords tend to be simple. They commonly take on the
characteristics of some type of meaningful detail to the user. Typically, user-generated
passwords are composed of birth dates, spouse's names, nicknames, street names and
other data connected with a user's Ulfestyle (Menkus, 1988). In many cases, passwords
can be found in personnel files. The Department of Defense uses teams of computer
experts to test the integrity of security systems. These tiger teams routinely comb
personnel files, for passwords based on personal data. They are usually successful
(Wood, 1983).
Morris and Thompson (1979) studied the characteristics of user-generated
passwords. They collected 3,289 users' passwords over a long period. They wanted to
identify a user's habits in selecting password when no constraints were placed on their
choice. The distribution of these passwords based on their physical characteristics is
shown below:
1. 0.45% were a single ASCII character;
2. 2.0% were strings of two ASCII characters;
3. 14.0% were of three ASCII characters;
4. 14.5% were strings of four alphanumerics;
5. 21.4% were five letters, all uppercase or all lowercase;
6. 18.3% were six letters, all lowercase;
Of the 3,289 passwords collected, 86% fell into one of the above classes. In
addition, 15% of the passwords appeared in dictionaries, name lists and the like (Mo'nis
and Thompson, 1979). This makes user-selected password more vulnerable to being
guessed by simply conducting a word search on a dictionary or word list in a word
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processing software package. The lower half of the distribution it can be seen that users'
passwords were typically made of normal alphabetic characters. This inference provides
support to the premise that users typically choose passwords that are common or are
some type of meaningful detail to them.
User-selected passwords have the advantage of being simple and meaningful. The
disadvantage is that they are frequently based on trivial association and can be guessed
by outsiders (Ahituv et al., 1987). This thesis takes a closer look at the characteristics
of user generated passwords, password selection criteria and variables that may influence
selection memorability and predictability.
3. Manufacturer-Generated Passwords
Manufacturers typically embed or hard-code passwords into programs. These
embedded passwords serve as example passwords and are published in system
documentation (Wood, 1983). Example passwords are intended to be temporary until a
user selects a replacement. If a user does not remove an example password, it may
become a source of vulnerability.
Another type of manufacturer's password is that used by field representatives
and technicians. These passwords typically take the forms of test passwords and system
passwords (Barton and Barton, 1984). They serve as a quick method by which
technicians can gain access for maintenance and repairs. Knowledge of these passwords
may allow unauthorized users to penetrate a security system.
4. Classification by Use
Passwords are also clissified by their use: primary, secondary and duiess.
Primary passwords are used to gain access to an initial set of resources (Menkus, 1988).
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Such as access to a building, a terminal room or terminal login. Secondary passwords
are used as supplements to gain access to a subset of resources (Menkus, 1988). This
includes access to classified databases, sensitive files and system level application
controllers. Duress passwords are used when a user is under duress from a potential
intruder. If a user is held at gunpoint, a duress password, instead of the usual password,
can be entered to cause the system to simulate a crash, to alert the police or to take
some other action unbeknownst to the person applying the duress (Wood, 1983). In
addition, passwords can be dynamic in the sense of requiring a different password at each
log-in (Avarne, 1988).
C. CONSTRUCTION OF PASSWORDS
The success of passwords as a security mechanism is related directly to good
construction. Three criteria govern good construction: length, character set and
memorability.
1. Length
The longer the password, the more difficult it is to guess it and therefore the
more secure it is (Wood, 1983). Passwords are commonly constructed of' six to eight
characters. This length is popular for two reasons. First, six to eight characters are
sufficient to guard against a "brute-force" attack (Wood, 1983). Second, memory aids
are commonly required for recall of passwords of more than eight characters (Menkus,
1988). The elimination of memory aids decreases the probability that passwords will be
committed to paper.
The minimum length of a password determines the lower bound of security
(Menkus, 1988). Fisher (1983) suggests that the minimum length should be a set of
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characters that would yield at least one million possible combinations. The following sets
meet this minimum constraint: six decimal digits, e.g., 195863; five hexadecimal
characters, e.g., 1D6FC; five alphabetic characters, e.g., AZHWO or four alphanumeric
characters, e.g., HW39 (Fisher, 1984). A consideration in selecting a minimum length
is that intruders will be attracted to trying all possible combinations in an exhaustive or
brute-force attack. In an exhaustive attack, an intruder will need only try 40% of the
possibilities to break a password (Menkus, 1988). A password composed of three
numeric characters yields one thousand possibilities. A computer programmed to try each
of the possible combinations will likely break the password in little time. Doubling
length increases the effort required by orders of magnitude (Menkus, 1988). If three
numerics were increased to six numerics, the combinations increase from one thousand
to one million.
The design of the length of passwords should also consider whether a system
will allow a user to construct a password that is shorter than the maximum. For
example, if a password is designed to be eight numeric characters, will a system allow
a user to use only four characters? Most systems will enter trailing blanks in the unfilled
spaces (Menkus, 1988). A common ploy is for a potential penetrator to concentrate on
trailing blanks first (Menkus, 1988). Elimination of the blanks reduces the total
combinations that an intruder must attempt. By eliminating four trailing blanks, an
intruder reduces the work factor from one hundred million to ten thousand possibilities.
2. Character Set
The set of characters coupled with the number of characters determines the
effectiveness of passwords. The ideal password is composed of random characters, such
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as "k&)8[" (Barton and Barton, 1984). While random characters are more secure, they
are seldom pronounceable. When a password is pronounceable, users will be better able
to remember it (Kurzban, 1983). The addition of vowels increases pronounceability.
However, the resulting password will be more vulnerable to attack (Kurzban, 1983). For
example, if vowels are inserted into the string CTWLK, it becomes CATWALK.
3. Character Set vs. Length
As stated earlier the longer the password the more secure it is, coupling length
with character set determines a password's effectiveness as an access control mechanism.
Character set randomness is a key is a to an effective password. The greater the length
and the more random the characters are in the password the lesser the predictability and
the greater the time required for an intruder to penetrate a secure system using passwords
as an access control mechanism. Morris and Thompson (1979) calculated the estimated
time required to test all possible character strings of n length chosen from various sets
of characters. A PDP-11/70 was the test instrument.
TABLE 3-1 Morris and Thompson's Table:
26 36 62 95 all 128
lower case lower case alphanumeric printable ASCII
letters letters and characters characters characters
digits
n
1 30msec 40msec 80msec !20msec 160msec
2 800msec 2sec 5sec 1 lsec 20sec
3 22sec 58sec 5min 17min 44min
4 10min 35min 5hrs 28hrs 93hrs
5 4hrs 21hrs 318hrs I12days 500days
6 107hrs 760hrs 2.2yrs 29yrs 174yrs
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As be seen by the table, a password of considerable length and randomness provides
a better degree of access control for information system security. The longer it takes
a potential intruder to penetrate a system the greater the chances of detection and
prevention (Morris and Thompson, 1979).
4. Memorability
The ability to remember and recall passwords is of paramount importance in
their construction. Most users require memory aids to help recall (Menkus, 1988). If
a memory aid means writing the password on paper, a basic tenet of password security
has been violated. A password committed to paper has changed from something
known to something possessed (Porter, 1984). An intruder's work switches from
guessing to searching.
An appeal to long term memory has been divided into two classifications of
memory: semantic and episodic. These two classes form the basis for three approaches
to enhancing the memorability of passwords: semantic, episodic and environmental
(Barton and Barton, 1984).
Semantic memory uses information closely related to language use.
Passwords using this approach are derived from well-known character strings, such as
nursery rhymes. Nursery rhymes and similar strings are easily recalled, thereby
eliminating the need for memory aids. For example, "Jack and Jill went up the hill"
is a well known line from a childhood poem. In addition, these character strings are
not related to a user's lifestyle. Once identified. the string can be used with a hashig
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routine or a transform procedure to produce a phoneme, word or phrase that is actually
the password.
Episodic memory relies directly on individual, personal experience. To a
large degree, this experience will be unshared. Provided the user avoids the obvious
references to experience, such as birthday dates and children's names, this type of
memory is recommended for password systems. Transform procedures can operate in
conjunction with episodic memory to produce passwords.
Environmental clues trigger the recall of passwords. A picture on the office
wall or a room number can serve as the basis of a character string. If a user's
terminal is located in a room that is painted green, "green walls" could serve as an
initial character string. If a user's office is in room 821 at 1275 Sams Street, 8211275
could serve as an environmental trigger for a password. This string could then be
manipulated by a transform procedure to produce the actual password. In the above
example of 8211275, a transform procedure could take the even digits of 822 and add
that result back to the initial room number to come up with the final password; i.e.,
822 plus 821 equals 1643. In this example, 1643 is the password triggered by the
environmental clue of the room number 821.
5. Transform Procedures
Character strings produced by any of the three methods above can be coupled
with transform procedures. A transform procedure manipulates a string to produce a
user-recognizable and memorable password (Barton and Barton, 1984). Effective
transfonn procedures are evaluated oii the following criteria: ability to achieve a high
degree of congeniality; i.e., easy to remember and to execute; ability to produce
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structured passwords that can be recreated which helps error discovery and ability to
produce passwords resistant to guessing and systematic trials. Common transform
techniques are excerption and substitution. In excerption, a designated number of
characters are excerpted based on their position within a string. The excerpted
characters form the actual password. Substitution can also be used. Common
substitution practices include the substitution of preceding or succeeding characters.
The resulting string of substituted characters constitutes the password (Barton and
Barton, 1984).
6. Mnemonics
Closely related to transform procedures are mnemonics. The phonetic
sounding of a character string may yield an expression that is pronounceable and
memorable (Barton and Barton, 1984). For example, the character string FRGTFL
could be phonetically sounded as FOR-GET-FUL. While FRGTFL is the password,
the phrase FOR-GET-FUL is the mnemonic that causes the password to be memorable.
Other ways of avoiding memory aids are: inverting the order of characters, converting
alphabetic characters to their numeric equivalents, shifting characters one or two
positions and creating acronyms from initial letters of a meaningful phrase (Menkus,
1988).
7. Summary
Good formulation produces passwords that are distanced enough in fonn from
ordinary experience to make compromise unlikely (Barton and Barton. 1984). Whether
produced by semantic, episodic or environmental methodologies, passwords should be
25
evaluated for effectiveness. Ahituv et al. (1987) propose the following evaluation
criteria:
1. should be easily memorized;
2. should be hard to guess through association;
3. should be easy to enter into the computer;
4. should not be able to be used if expired;
5. should be resistant to attack by spoofing or trojan horses;
6. should be tested;
7. should not take a long time to implement;
8. should not be cost prohibitive.
D. VULNERABILITIES OF PASSWORDS
The use of passwords as a security mechanism is a much debated topic. Opinions
on effectiveness range from the criticism of they offer little resistance to a serious
attack (Avame, 1988) or their use is rarely well managed (Menkus, 1988) to the praise
of the most cost-effective approach to human user authentication (Wood, 1983).
Menkus (1988) makes the comparison of a password to a conventional lock; it keeps
out only honest people.
Traditional passwords have three weaknesses: they can often be guessed, they are
entered in the clear where they can be observed and they are used more than once
(Avame, 1988). These weaknesses are further supplemented by Ahituv et al. (1987):
passwords are normally stored in tables in an operating system which itself is subject
to compromise and spoof routines. Spoof routines, explained below. can be used
during a log-in procedure to capture passwords from an unsuspecting user.
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Eight methods of finding out a password have been identified: guessing, reading,
hash tables, eavesdropping, intercept, signal radiation, spoofing and terminal buffers
(Avame, 1988).
1. Guessing
Users commonly use names, telephone numbers and other trivial but
memorable data as passwords. Guessing entails repeated trials based on knowledge
about a targeted user. To prevent guessing, systems may be equipped with counter
programs that allow only a certain number of unsuccessful attempts before freezing out
a would-be user. Such systems can still be penetrated through the intruder attempting
one less than the maximum allowable attempts each day.
2. Reading
Passwords committed to paper are usually looked up just before a log-in.
People nearby may see the location of a written password. Systems requiring frequent
changes of passwords may increase the likelihood of users writing them down. In
addition, frequent changes in passwords may be circumvented by re-entering an
identical password or alternating between two passwords.
3. Hash Tables
Hash tables may lead to a false sense of security. An intruder needs only
to know a hashed result of a password. Any character string that yields the same
hashed result will suffice.
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4. Eavesdropping
Most computer terminals do not echo a password back to the screen.
Nonetheless, a person nearby may observe a sequence of keystrokes. Even listening
to the number of keystrokes yields the length of a password.
5. Intercept
The proliferation of networks is a rich area for exploitation. Tapping into a
line between a terminal and a host can give direct access to an intruder.
6. Signal Radiation
All electronic equipment, unless Tempest certified, emits radiomagnetic
signals. These signals can be monitored and intercepted. Each keystroke emits a
unique signal that can be correlated to give a direct interception of transmissions.
7. Spoofing
Penetrators develop programs that emulate terminal log-in procedures. A
valid user enters a password not knowing that a spoof program is receiving the data
instead of the computer. At the end of a log-in procedure, the computer gives an error
message. The user assumes that a error has been made in keying in the information
and re-enters the password. On the second try, the log-in is successful. Unbeknownst




Passwords are written into a buffer from which the security program can read
the entry. If a buffer is of large size or if system usage is low, a password may stay
resident in a buffer for an indefinite time. An intruder monitoring a buffer may be
able to read its passwords that are still resident.
E. MANAGING A PASSWORD SECURITY SYSTEM
How well a password system works depends primarily on how well the system is
managed. Effective password system management involves proper system
administration, implermmentation, protection and periodic evaluation.
1. Administration of Passwords
Password systems require maintenance. Akin to logical fences, passwords
systems require periodic maintenance (Wood, 1983). In large systems, security may
be in the hands of a full-time security manager. In smaller systems, security is likely
to be part of a system administrator's job.
A security manager is responsible for maintaining and modifying a computer
system's security. As well as duties related to passwords, a manager is responsible for
physical security and disaster recovery. Monitoring a system for evidence of tampering
and proper password use are a security manager's primary duties.
User education in security matters is also a concern of a security manager
(Wood, 1983). Users have certain responsibilities when using the system and should
be aware of the consequences of inappropriate actions (Panns and Herschberg. 1987).
Education will make users aware of how a password system can protect their
information from unauthorized access. At the same time, educated users will be aware
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of how the design and protection of passwords can enhance overall system security.
Help with developing passwords should be available on-line. Technical information
about length, type of characters and ranges should be accessible to users (Barton and
Barton, 1984).
2. Password System Implementation
Wood (1983) asserts that a password security system is successful if it meets
the following criteria:
1. passwords are not visible when typed;
2. an alarm is generated if successive log-hi attempts exceed a maximum, usually
three;
3. a password storage table is encrypted and is not reversible;
4. passwords travelling over networks are encrypted;
5. provision is made for a special password to indicate a user is under duress and
is being forced to log-in;
6. error messages are limited to a single message that does not indicate which step
in the log-in process was wrong;
7. a password routine is segregated from the resource that it protects;
8. re-verification of a password is required if a session exceeds a time limit;
9. automatic log-off occurs if no activity takes place after a prescribed tine period.
Successful implementation of system-generated passwords should include
provisions for the secure distribution of passwords. Two common distribution methods
are (1) conventional mail using double envelopes or specially designed envelopes that
mask a password and (2) network transmission using encryption (Menkus. 198 ). A
user-selected password system eliminates the need for a password distribution system
(Spender, 1987).
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A password security system requires the commitment of top management.
Information is a strategic resource. Lost or damaged information may have costly
implications for an organization. Historically, hardware was the major cost of a
computer system. In recent information systems, software is the major expense.
Management often uses hardware values instead of the value of the information to base
their security decisions (Wood, 1983).
3. Protection of Passwords
Successfully breaking a password may allow an unauthorized user total
access to a computer system. In many systems, passwords are not only the first line
of defense (Wood, 1983) they are the only line of defense. With the importance
placed on passwords, security of passwords is a major concern. Passwords may be
compromised by (Morris and Thompson, 1979; Pfleeger, 1989):
1. trying all possibilities;
2. trying all probable passwords;
3. trying passwords likely for a user;
4. searching for a system list of passwords;
5. asking a user.
Additional protection may be had through the use of encryption. Techniques
include encryption of password tables stored in memory, use of one-time encrypted
passwords and use of personal keys that are inserted after a plain text password is
entered (Ahituv et al., 1987). One-way encryption increases the work needed to enter
a system (Menkus, 1988). Encryption of password tables may be accomplished by the
simple addition or subtraction of soe constant (Menkus, 1988). Whichever encryption
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method is used, care should be given to ensure that an encryption process does not
expose encryption techniques used for other resources (Ahituv et al., 1987).
4. Improvements to Passwords and Password Systems
Cooper (1989), Morris and Thompson (1979) and Pfleeger (1989) identifies
seven ways to improve the effectiveness of passwords as an access control mechanism:
1. use more than A - Z;
2. choose long passwords;
3. avoid actual names or words;
4. choose an unlikely password;
5. change the password regularly;
6. don't write it down;
7. don't tell anyone else.
Menkus (1988) identifies five ways to improve the performance of a
password security system:
1. insist that an organization's policies are enforced;
2. prohibit storing of passwords in tables to speed up network connectivity;
3. penalize deliberate disclosure of passwords no matter how good the excuse;
4. require frequent changing and
5. insist that passwords be actually changed.
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F. SUMMARY
Passwords can be an inexpensive, effective means to system security. The tradeoff
between memorability (ease of use) and security will affect a user's environment. If
a user's environment is unfriendly, a user will find ways of overcoming the difficulty
and in turn, may compromise system security (Martin, 1973). A hostile environment





The purpose of this research is to identify the characteristics of user-generated
passwords and determine if any causal relationships may exist between these
characteristics and relevant variables (e.g., frequency of changing passwords, sensitivity
of data and frequency of logging on). The study is based on statistical analysis of
empirical data which were collected for this purpose at the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS). This chapter presents the data collection methodology, the statistical analysis
strategy and the sample characteristics.
B. INSTRUMENTATION
In order to gather data about specific areas of interest with regards to user-
generated password characteristics, a self-administered questionnaire was developed.
A copy of this questionnaire is included in appendix A. The questionnaire focuses on
three major issues: demographics, password characteristics and password memorability.
The structure of the questionnaire is as follows:
1. Demographic Items
The first part of the questionnaire addressed a respondent's basic
characteristics. Questions 1-3 asked for a respondent's age, sex and academic
curriculum number (for students) or department number (for faculty/staff) respectively.
The fourth question asked respodewts if they use the NPS mainframe computer system.
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If the respondent responded "yes", he or she proceeded to complete the remaining
parts of the questionnaire.
2. Password Characteristics Data Items
The second part of the questionnaire addressed password structure and
characteristics. Question number five asked a respondent to reveal the number of
characters in his or her password. The questionnaire warned respondents not to reveal
their specific password but only its characteristics. Respondents were then asked how
they chose their password. There were five choices available:
1. meaningful detail such as a name, date or number;
2. a combination of meaningful details such as "Bill89" or "MaryJane#1";
3. a pronounceable password such as "2Bfree" or "eyewilllive";
4. random combination of characters;
5. other.
This question was followed by a similar question requesting the
characteristics of the password. These could be alphabetic, numeric, alphanumeric or
ASCII.
3. Data on Password Memorability and Computer Usage Characteristics
Whereas the previous questions specifically addressed the characteristics of
a user-generated password, the remaining questions were concerned with a respondents
computer usage and the memorability and predictability user-generated passwords.
Question eight asked a respondent if he or she had difficulty remembering a password.
If yes, question nine asked req)p1ndents to reveal if the password was written down.
Expectations are that if a passw'ord is difficult to remember it will be written down.
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If the password was written down, question ten asked a respondent to say where it was
written down. If a password is difficult to remember but not written down e-xpectations
are that it will be forgotten. Once forgotten, a user no longer has access to the system
unless a system administrator allows him or her to choose a new password or refreshes
their memory by telling them their forgotten password. Question 11 asked respondents
how often they change their password. The frequency of change could be due to
expected intrusion into files, standard procedures or as a result of poor memory and
not being able to remember the password. Most often if a password is easy to
remember, guessing is easy. If guessing is easy, a password provides little access
control. Question 12 asked respondents if they ever changed a password because they
believed it had been guessed. This question is followed up by the question about
what led them to believe it had been guessed.
Questions 14 and 15 asked a respondent to reveal the sensitivity and
importance of his or her data on a scale of one to five. One was the lowest and five
the highest degree of sensitivity and importance of the data. Data sensitivity refers to
the degree to which problems would result if your data is disclosed. Data importance
refers to value your data. Expectations are that a user would generate a password as
secure as the importance and sensitivity of the data it controls access to.
Question 16 asked respondents from where do they normally work when
using a computer system. There were four choices available:
1. private office at NPS;
2. home;
3. public terminal at NPS:
4. other.
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Many cognitive psychologists propose that anything frequently used would
be easy to remember. Frequency of use enhances memorability. Question 17 asked
respondents to reveal the frequency by which they log on to the NPS mainframe
system. Expectations are that with a high frequency of mainframe usage there would
a high degree of password memorability. However, with a high frequency of logging
on there is a hazard of guessing if a password is not frequently changed. Questions
18 and 19" asked respondents if they used computer systems other than the NPS
mainframe system. If so, they were asked if they used the same password they used
on the NPS mainframe.
C. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The population consisted of students and faculty/staff members at NPS. There
were roughly a total of 1600 students and 400 faculty and staff members in the
population. A total of 2000 questionnaires were distributed using the schools internal
mail system. 997 responded of which 208 were faculty/staff and 787 were students.
The reason for selecting this particular population was both students and faculty, upon
reporting to the school, are given computer mainframe accounts at the school's main
computer center. These accounts can only be accessed with an account number
provided by the computer center and a password the user creates. A two month time
period was provided for respondents to return the questionnaire.
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D. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS STRATEGY
1. Level of measurement
To relate or associate one concept with another the appropriate statistical or
mathematical procedure must be selected. Level of measurement determines which
statistical procedure is appropriate to test for relationships and associations. When one
talks about the level of measurement, he or she usually mean the assigning of numbers
to observations in such a way that the numbers are amenable to analysis by
manipulation or operations according to certain rules (Siegel and Castellan, 1988).
There are four levels of measurement that scientists consider in gathering data:
nominal, ordinal, interval and dichotomous.
a. Nominal
When numbers or other symbols are used to identify the groups to
which various objects belong, those numbers constitute a nominal or categorical scale
(Siegel and Castellan, 1988). Numbers on football jerseys or automobile license plates
comprise nominal scales. Word names such as Protestant, Catholic, Jew or Republican,
Democrat, Libertarian, Socialist are examples of nominals. Variables being analyzed
in this thesis constituting nominal levels of measurement are:
1. how password was chosen;
2. where respondent normally worked when using a computer system;
3. how password was guessed;
4. where password was written down;
5. characteristics of passw''id.
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b. Ordinal
It is frequently possible to order categories with respect to the degree
to which they possess a certain characteristic (Blalock, 1979). If it is possible to have
a complete rank ordering of classes, we have an ordinal scale. An example of this
would be to classify families in the upper, upper-middle, middle, lower-middle and
lower classes according to their socioeconomic status. Ordinal thesis variables are:
1. how vital is your data;
2. how sensitive is your data;
3. how often do you log on;
4. how often do you change your password;
c. Interval
When a scale has all the characteristics of an ordinal scale and when,
in addition, the distances and differences between any two numbers on the scale have
meaning, an interval scale level of measurement has been achieved (Siegel and
Castellan, 1988). Temperature is an example of an interval scale level of measurement.
The number of characters in the password was the only relevant interval scale variable
in this thesis.
d. Dichotomous
A dichotomous level of measurement is a measurement of a variable
with only two possible categories or values, such as yes or no and male or female
(Nie, et al., 1975). The dichotomous thesis variables are
1. was password difficult to remember;
2. was password written down:
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3. was password guessed;
4. do you use non-NPS computer systems;
5. do you use the NPS mainframe;
6. do you use the NPS mainframe password on non-NPS system.
By classifying data by the levels of measurement the decision of which
statistical test/model to use can be easily answered. The ability to manipulate data in
order to test for relationships or associations between objects being observed or to
obtain new information about the objects is dependent on the level of measurement.
2. Coding Technique
Each variable, based on its level of measurement, was assigned an identity
number to facilitate data analysis. Nominal variables, such as how password was
guessed, were assigned numerical values for each response type. For example,
"meaningful detail" was assigned a value of one while "other" was assigned five.
Ordinal variables assumed the same coding characteristics as nominal variables. For
the nominal variable how often do you log on, the response "never" was assigned a
value of one and "more than once a day" was assigned a nine. Interval variables
assumed the values originally assigned to them by respondents. Dichotomous variables
assume either a one or a zero. For the yes/no dichotomous variables, "yes" was
assigned a one and "no" was assigned a zero. With the sex type dichotomous variable.




Based on the level of measurement, interpretable operations can be carried
out on a given set of variables (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). Since the levels of
measurement have been determined, the appropriate statistical test can now be
performed to test for relationships and associations along with obtaining new
information about the variables being tested.
Statistical testing can take the form of either descriptive or analytical
statistical analysis. Descriptive analysis is concerned with summarizing and describing
a given set of data. Examples of this would be arithmetic means test, standard
deviations, modes and medians (Mansfield, 1983). Analytical statistical analysis is
concerned with rational decision making under uncertainty, such as hypothesis testing,
analysis of variance and regression analysis (Mansfield, 1983). Both types of analysis
will be used in this thesis.
The most functional descriptive statistic to be used in the data analysis is
the arithmetic mean. The means test determines the average observation in a given set
of data. Also of interest is the distribution of the sample data amongst the various
categories. Of more interest are the tests of associations or relations provided by the
various analytical statistical tests available. With the level of measurement determined
the appropriate statistical tests can be chosen. Blalock (1979) and Siegel and Castellan
(1988) provide a decision matrix for determining the appropriate test for relation or
association once the level of measurement has been determined. An applicable decision
matrix derived using Blalock anI Siegal's matrices is provided below. The axes if the
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INTERVAL ORDINAL NOMINAL DICHOTOMUS
INTERVAL Pearson' s ANOVA T-TEST
R
LEVELS
OF ORDINAL ---- Spearmnan's Kruskal- Mann-
R - Wallis - Whitney
MEASURE-
MENT
NOMINAL ANOVA Kruskal- Cramer's Cramer's
- Wallis V V
DICHOTOMUS T-TEST Mann- Cramer's CHI-Square
Whitney V
As can be noted in the decision matrix, each variable based on its level of
measurement requires a specific yet appropriate statistical test in order to test for
relationships among the various variables.
4. Test Descriptions
a. Hypothesis testing
A hypothesis is a statement that can be tested with inferential stati, ical
procedures (Porter and Harmi. I U86). Experinental hypotheses must be stated in letlil,
of a null hypothesis and an alternative or research hypothesis. A null hypothesis is
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hypothesis is usually a statement that there is no difference between populations being
compared or that no association/relationship exist between the two. An alternative
hypothesis, by default states that a difference or association does exist between the
populations. An alternative hypothesis is "accepted" when a null hypothesis is rejected.
Testing tries to reject the null hypothesis. Rejection occurs when a tabulated critical
value, different for each statistical test (depends on the particular test, degrees of
freedom and in most cases population size), is less than a test value found by carrying
out computations unique to a particular set of variables. A level of significance is
established for each statistical test. This level of significance value is the probability
of rejecting a null hypothesis when actually it is true (Porter and Hamm, 1986).
Typically, the level of significance is set at either .01 or .05. At an .01 level of
significance, there is a 1% chance that the null hypothesis is true and rejecting it is a
mistake. If an analytical test's computed significance value is less than the level of
significance established for the test, then the findings from the test are said to be
significant. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected.
b. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Test
This is a parametric test used to test for associations between
nominal and interval variables. Such a test produces a F-statistic and a significance
value. This F-value compares the variability between the groups being tested to the
variability within the groups. When compared to a tabulated critical value, this vadue
determines whether a null hypothesis can or cannot be rejected. The significance value
determines if the F-value could have been obtained by chance alone in most cases of
a hypothetical large number of tests.
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c. Chi-Square Test
The Chi-square test of homogeneity is used to analyze qualitative data
from two dichotomus populations. It produces a Chi-square value and a significance
value. The Chi-square value, when compared to a critical value extracted from the
Chi-square table, determines if a null hypothesis can be rejected. The higher the Chi-
square value the greater the degree of association between the two dichotomus
variables.
d. Cramer's V Test
This a test of measurement of the degree of association or relation
between nominal variables and nominal vs dichotomus variables. It produces a
Cramer's coefficient of association and a significance value. The closer the coefficient
is to unity, the greater is the degree of association between the two variables.
e. Kruskal-Wallis Test
A Kruskal-Wallis test determines whether an observed difference
between groups is due to sampling error or treatment effect (Porter and Hamm, 1986).
Similar to the ANOVA test, it produces an F-value and a significance value.
f. Mann-Whitney Test
This is used when testing ordinal data in rank order against dichotomus
data. It is frequently used when the T-test cannot be used. The test produces a Mann-
Whitney U value and a significance value. The Mann-Whitney U value, when
compared to a critical value, determines whether to reject a null hypothesis that no




A Spearman's R test is used when both variables are ordinal. The
resulting test values are a correlation coefficient and a significance value, the closer
the coefficient value is to unity the greater the degree of association.
h. T-Test
A T-test is used to assess the difference between the arithmetic means
of scores from two independent groups. It produces a T-value and a significance
value. If a computed T-value is greater than a tabulated critical value, a null




Of the 997 respondents, 903 were male, 92 were female while only two were
missing data. The average, age of respondents was 34, in a range from 23 to 76.
As stated earlier, of the 997 respondents, 208 were from faculty and staff while 789
were from students. The distribution of respondents from the various curricula was
fairly evenly distributed. The majority of the respondents were from the hard
science/computer-use oriented curricula. These included operations research/analysis
and the computer technology curricula.
B. PASSWORD CHARACTERISTICS FINDINGS
Figure 5-1 reflects the distribution of the number of characters in each respondents
password. The mean number of characters was six in a range from one to 15. 13.8%
of the respondents did not reveal the number of cf.,, cters in their password.
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FIGURE 5-1
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The distribution of how each respondent chose his or her password is shown in
Figure 5-2 below. As expected, a plurality of the respondents (65.2%) chose their
password from some type of meaningful detail. Meaningful detail was explained as
some type of name, date or combination of the two to represent something meaningful
to the respondent. 13.1% of the respondents did not answer this particular question.
FIGURE 5-2
Type of Choice Number of Respondents Percent
Meaningful Detail 561 65.2
Combination of
Meaningful Detail 114 13.2
Pronounceable 47 5.5
Random Combination
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In revealing the characteristics of their passwords, 80.1% of the respondents who
answered this question used passwords made up of alphabetic characters. The data in
Figure 5-3 shows the distribution of the characteristics of each respondents password.
FIGURE 5-3
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C. PASSWORD MEMORABILITY FINDINGS
How a password is chosen or the characteristics of a password should, in some way,
affect its memorability. Relationships between these and other variables will be
presented in Chapter VI. However, only 9.7% (83) of the respondents who answered
this question, found it difficult to remember their password. 200 respondents found
it necessary to write down their password. If a respondents password was written
down Figure 5-4 shows where respondents said they wrote.
FIGURE 5-4
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The frequency with which a password is changed may result from a password being
difficult to remember, the suspicion that a password has been guessed, or security
conscious procedure. The data in Figure 5-5 shows the distribution of the frequency
with which passwords are changed by each respondent.
FIGURE 5-5
Frequency Number of Respondents Percent
Never 684 79.5
Less than once a year 128 14.9
Up to three times a year 33 3.8
4 -6 times a year 8 0.9
Once a month 5 0.6
More than once a month 2 0.2
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As can be noted, there were only 5.5% (48) of the respondents who changed their
password with any degree of frequency.
Only 4.5% (38) of the respondents believed that their password had been guessed.
The data in Figure 5-6 shows the distribution of the respondents reasons why they
believed their password had been guessed.
FIGURE 5-6
Reason Number of Respondents Percent
Files altered 9 23.7
Told password 4 10.5
Unintentional Disclosure 10 26.3
Other 15 39.5
N WAS~o)
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D. COMPUTER USAGE FINDINGS
The frequency with which a respondent logs on to the NPS mainframe was found
to be fairly evenly distributed among the nine available choices. Figure 5-7 shows that
roughly one fifth or about 19% of all respondents log onto the mainframe system
several time a week.
FIGURE 5-7
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Tables 5-1 and 5-2 show the distribution of how each respondent viewed the
sensitivity and importance of their data. With the lowest level of data sensitivity being
one, it can be seen in Table 5-1 that most respondents (82%) viewed their data as not
sensitive. However, the distribution for data importance was more evenly spread, with
15% of the respondents viewing their data as being vital.
TABLE 5-1














More than 50% of all respondents use NPS terminals when using a computer
system. Table 5-3 shows that 18.6% (160) of the respondents use a NPS terminal in
a private office while 57.9% (497) of the respondents use the public terminals at the
NPS computer center or various labs.
TABLE 5-3
Place of work Number of Respondents Percent
Private NPS office 160 18.6
Home 185 21.6
Public terminal 497 57.9
Other 16 1.9
Twenty-seven percent (274) of all respondents use computer systems other than the
NPS mainframe. Of those 274, less than half (104) used the same password used on
the NPS mainframe on the non-NPS computer systems.




You have just entered the main computer center of your organization. In a few
moments you will be issued a computer account which requires the use of a password
to access it. You choose a password you feel will meet computer center security
requirements, provide you with access to your account, protect your resources and still
be easy to use. What factors did you consider during the selection of your password?
Will you write it down? Is it a secure password?
The analysis that follows looks closely at the data findings and attempts to relate
what has been previously found to these findings. Of interest in this analysis is to see
if password memorability and ease of guessing are associated with variables assessed
by the self-administered survey. There are four areas of interest:
1) What variables are associated with a decision to write down a password.
2) What factors are related to how difficult a password is to remember.
3) The variables that are related to the ease of guessing a password.
4) How the sensitivity and importance of data are related to password selection.
All statistical computations were produced by the SPSS Statistical Package (Norusis,
1988). Relevant data printouts of the various statistical test computations can be found
in Appendix B.
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B. WRITING DOWN A PASSWORD
The variable "do you write down your password", a dichotomus variable, was tested
with six other variables for associations. The assumptions of this analysis is that
respondents will write down their password if:
1. it is difficult to remember;
2. it is not used often;
3. the characteristics of the password make it difficult to remember;
4. the password is selected poorly;
5. the password is changed often.
A null hypothesis was established for all tests. This null hypothesis stated that no
association exists between the two variables being tested. The alternative hypothesis
stated that some association exists. All tests were be conducted at the .01 level of
significance. The findings of each test are presented in the table below. The
horizontal axis represent the level of measurement assigned to each variable tested, the
statistical test for association used for the two variables, the resulting test and
significance values, the interpretation of these values and the location in the appendix
of the data printouts associated with each test. The vertical axis represent the variables
being tested for association against the test variable.
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TABLE 6-1
Do You Write Down Your Password
Level of Test Test Sign. Interpre- Refer
Variable Measure- Conducted Value Value -tation to
(1) 
-ment (2) (3) Appendix
Number Interval T-test -.20 .839 NA - SI B-i
Password Nominal Crmr's V .1194 .0065 WA - SS B-2
Chosen Nominal Crmr's V .0875 .1584 NA - SI B-3
Change Ordinal Mann-Whit 65972 .9899 SA - SI B-4
Remember Dichotomus CHI-sqr 38.45 .0000 MA - SS B-5
Logging Ordinal Mann-Whit 49783 .0000 SA - SS B-6
LEGEND
1. Variables: Number - Number of characters in password.
Password - Password characteristics.
chosen - How password was chosen.
Change - How often password is changed.
Remember - Do you have difficulty remembering password.
Logging on - How often do you log on to a system.
2. Test values: The CHI-Square test has a critical value of 6.64.
The T-test has a critical value of 1.645.
3. Interpretation: NA - No association exists between the two variables.
WA - A weak association exists.
MA - A medium association exists.
SA - A strong association exists.
SI - A statistically insignificant finding.
SS - A statistically significant finding.
System-generated passwords typically consist of pseudo-random characters ( Wood,
1983; Menkus, 1988). They, therefore, tend to be complicated, difficult to remember
and unpopular with users (Wood, 1983). If a password is not easy to remembe, thllen
users tend to write it down (Avarne. 1988). 83 respondents found it difficull to
remember their password. However. 200 respondents felt it was necessary to write
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down their password. Users who perceive they will not be using the computer system
on frequent basis may chose to write down their password for future reference. Users
may write down a password simply out of habit. Or users may write down a password
because frequent change requirements are too demanding for their mental capacity or
desire to remember. More change increases the likelihood a password will be
forgotten.
The number of characters in a password was found to have a statistically
insignificant non-association with writting down a password. This finding is not
surprising; the number of characters in a password is, however, expected to affect
memorability. It follows that if password is difficult to remember it is written down
(Avarne, 1988).
Password characteristics was found to have a weak, statistically significant
association with writting down a password. Here expectations also were that password
characteristics and how a password was chosen affects password memorability which
may lead to writting down a password.
How a password was chosen was found to have a statistically insignificant non--
association with whether a password is written down.
The memorability of a password influences password changes. If it is difficult to
remember then it is changed, written down or both. Data findings revealed a strong
association between the frequency of changing a password and whether it is written
down. However, the finding was not statistically significant.
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A medium, statistically significant association was found between password
memorability and whether it is written down. This finding strongly reinforces previous
research. If a password is difficult to remember it is written down (Avarne, 1988).
A strong association was found between the fiequency of logging on to a system
and whether a password is written down. As mentioned earlier, the higher the use of
a password the less likely it is to be forgotten. If it is not forgotten the need to write
it down is reduced. Once a user writes down a password, he or she is inclined to put
it in an insecure place (Spender, 1987). Of the respondents who wrote down their
passwords, 21.3% wrote it in a notebook, 42.1% stored it in their wallets, 16.8% on
a calendar and 12.2% stored the password in some sort of file. Once a password is
written down it is no longer something known, it becomes something possessed (Porter,
1982). Knowledge of the place where it is stored becomes something known.
Searching through a user's notebook, desk or diary is a good way of discovering a
password (Avame, 1988).
C. DIFFICULTY REMEMBERING A PASSWORD
Testing for association between variables that may relate to password memorability
was of particular interest for this analysis. An assumption was made that if a password
is difficult to remnicmber then it is written down. A password that is long is expected
to be more difficult to remember than one that is short. Password characteristics and
how the password was chosen are expected to be associated with password
memorability. Also, expectations are that if a password is frequently used it in less
likely to be forgotten. Considerations for how often a password is changed and
whether the password is used on other systems also is of interest. Difficulty
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remembering a password is a dichotomus variable. A null hypothesis was established
for testing for association between difficulty remembering your password and the other
variables mentioned earlier. The null hypothesis states that no association exists. All
testing was conducted at the .01 level of significance. The table below shows the
results of the tests for association.
TABLE 6-2
Do You Have Difficulty Remembering a Password
Level of Test Test Sign. Interpre- Refer
Variable Measure- Conducted Value Value -tation to
(1) -ment (2) (3) Appendix
Write Dichotomus CHI-sqr 38.45 .0000 MA - SS B-5
Number Interval T-test -.38 .706 NA - SI B-i
Password Nominal Crmr's V .1131 .0110 WA - SS B-7
Chosen Nominal Crmr's V .1221 .0121 WA - SS B-8
Logging Ordinal Mann-Whit 26259 .0214 SA - SS B-6
Change Ordinal Mann-Whit 25363 .0000 SA - SS B-4
Passsame Dichotomus CHI-sqr 1.475 .2245 NA - SI B-9
LEGEND
1. Variables: Number - Number of characters in password.
Password - Password characteristics.
Chosen - How password was chosen.
Change - How often password is changed.
Write - Do you write down your password.
Logging on - How often do you log on to a system.
Passsame - Do you use the same NPS password on other systems.
2. Test values: The CHI-Square tests have critical a value of 6.64.
The T-test has a critical value of 1.645.
3. Interpretation: NA - No association exists between the two variables.
WA - A weak association e::ists.
HA - A modivm association e::ists.
SA - A str. ? asseciation e::ists.
SI - A s'&isica11y insignificant finding.
SS - A stasistically significant finding.
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It has long been accepted that people can remember expressions of about seven
characters in length (Menkus, 1988) and typically remember expressions that have
particular meaning to them. Password length, characteristics, frequency of use and
change and how it was chosen are believed to influence password memorability
Menkus (1988).
As presented in the previous section password memorability and whether a password
is written down were found to have a significant, medium association. If a password
is difficult to remember it is forgotten if it is not written down.
Barton and Barton (1984) and Menkus (1988) suggests that the ability to recall a
password tends -to decrease as length increases. The average length of respondents
passwords in this study was six characters. The ideal length is six to eight characters
(Menkus, 1988). Only 83 respondents found it difficult to remember their password.
Only 10 respondents had passwords greater than eight characters. This indicates that
many of the respondents who had difficulty remembering their password, did so for
reasons other than length. The hypothesis test revealed a statistically insignificant non-
association exist between the number of characters in a password and difficulty in
remembering it. Other factors have a greater influence on password memorability for
this particular population.
The characteristics of a password or how it was chosen could have a greater effect
than password length. Users who choose their own password are more likely to
remember them (Wood, 1983). Users select from a simple domain of things
meaningful to them, something from episodic memory (Menkus, 1988: Wood., 1983).
Of the 997 respondents here. 675 chose passwords from meaningful details. 807
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constructed passwords of alphabetic or alphanumeric characters. Weak but significant
associations were found between password memorability and password characteristics
as well as how a password was chosen. This can be interpreted as a positive
relationship. As previous research revealed, an alphanumeric password chosen from
meaningful detail is more easily remembered than passwords generated from pseudo-
random combinations (Woods, 1983).
The frequency of use of a password should be related to password memorability.
687 respondents used their password with a frequency of once a month or more. The
association between difficulty remembering and frequency of logging on was found to
be strong but statistically insignificant. This supports the assumption that log on
frequency is related to password memorability.
Data analysis findings revealed a strong association between the frequency of
changing a password and password memorability. This supports previous research.
Frequently changing a password diminishes password memorability. Frequent change
increases the likelihood of a password being forgotten (Spender, 1987). Only 176
respondents changed their password with any degree of frequency.
D. GUESSING A PASSWORD
Respondents were asked whether their password had been guessed. If the answer
to this question was "yes" , immediately following was the question of "what led them
to believe it had been guessed? " 23% of the respondents who felt their password had
been guessed were led to that belief because their files had been altered. 26% believed
their password had been guessed due to unintentional disclosure; 10% intentional
disclosure and 39.5% some other action led them to believe that their password had
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been guessed. The objective that should be achieved when selecting a password is to
maximize ease of use (memorability) and minimize predictability. Of interest here are
associations between variables believed to be related to password predictability. " Was
your password guessed " is a dichotomus variable. It will be tested against how often
a password is changed, how a password was chosen, the frequency of logging on to
a system, password characteristics, whether a password was written down, data
importance and the number of characters in a password. Previous studies provides a
basis for assumming that password predictability is related to these variables. A null
hypothesis was established stating that no association exists between predictability and
these other factors. Table 6-3 shows the results of the statistical testing.
TABLE 6-3
Was Your Password Guessed
Level of Test Test Sign. Interpre- Refer
Variable Measure- Conducted Value Value -tation to
(1) -ment (2) (3) Appendix
Number Interval T-test -1.27 .204 NA - SI B-I
Write Dichotomus CHI-sqr .5280 .4674 NA - SI B-10
Password Nominal Crmr's V .1445 .0004 WA - SS B-il
Chosen Nominal Crmr's V .0935 .1145 NA - SI B-12
Logging Ordinal Mann-Whit 985.5 .4677 WA - SI B-4
Change Ordinal Mann-Whit 64125 .0000 SA - SS B-6
Work Nominal Crmr's V .2138 .0000 MA - SS B-13
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LEGEND
1. Variables: Number - Number of characters in password.
Password - Password characteristics.
Chosen - How password was chosen.
Change - How often password is changed.
write - Do you write down your password.
Logging on - How often do you log on to a system.
Work - From where do you normally work when using a system.
2. Test values: The CHI-Square test has a critical value of 6.64.
The T-test has a critical value of 1.645.
3. Interpretation: NA - No association exists between the two variables.
WA - A weak association exists.
MA - A medium association exists.
SA - A strong association exists.
SI - A statistically insignificant finding.
SS - A statistically significant finding.
Password compromises have resulted from information on computer bulletin boards,
from guesses about personal vitae, environmental cues and from systematic intrusions
(Barton and Barton, 1984). Experience shows that people prefer passwords that are
easy to remember (Avame, 1988). Easy to remember passwords are usually some form
of meaningful detail, simply structured and highly predictable. Guessing a password
is expected to be influenced by password characteristics, frequency of use, whether the
password was written down, how often it is changed, frequency of logging on or from
where a user normally works.
Only 38 respondents felt their password had been guessed. 23% of them felt their
password had been guessed because their files had been altered; 26% because of
unintentional disclosure, 10% intentionally revealed their password and 39.5% of the
respondents who's password had been guessed felt it had been guessed for some other
reason. 63.2% respondents who believed their password had been guessed had 11o idea
how it was guessed.
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Testing for association between the number of characters in a password and
password predictability revealed a statistically insignificant non-association exists.
Morris and Thompson (1979), in their study, revealed the shorter a password the less
time require by an intruder, using a brute force attack, to reveal the password.
Whether a password is written down was not associated with predictability. This
finding is not in standing with previous research that suggests once a password is
written down it becomes something possessed that can be lost or stolen.
Password characteristics was found to have a weak statistically significant association
with predictability. This supports earlier research. Relatively short passwords chosen
from some form of meaningful detail and consisting of alphanumerics make guessing
easy. Because of this, Morris and Thompson's (1979) study revealed that an intruder
conducting a dictionary search alone, would require only five minutes to reveal about
one-third of the 3,289 passwords collected.
Tests for association between how a password was chosen and password
predictability revealed that how a password was chosen had no association with
guessing. This contradicts previous research. Refering back to the Morris and
Thompson table presented in Chapter III, they revealed that passwords consisting of
simple letters/numerics required less time for prediction than those made of ASCII
characters. The test for association between log on frequency and password
predictability revealed a weak but statistically insignificant association. The frequency
of logging on to a system is expected to increase predictability. When a user logs on
to a system, someone can capture the password by watching keystrokes (Ahituv et al..
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1988). As stated earlier, 687 respondents logged on to a computer system more than
once a month.
Most previous research strongly support the frequent changing of passwords to
insure system security and reduce guessing. Wood (1983) asserts that passwords should
be changed annually. Menkus (1988) suggests every 30 days. Although changing a
password increases the level of system security, it hinders memorability. The trade-
off of ease of use and security must be optimized. Only 176 respondents changed their
password more than once a year. The test for association between frequency of change
and password predictability revealed a significantly strong association. This association
supports previous studies and the expectation that frequency of change decreases
predictability.
Where a user normally works when using a system is also expected to influence
predictability. Using a public terminal is more vulnerable than working in a private
office or at home. Of the 997 respondents, 185 worked at home, 160 worked from a
private office and 497 worked on public terminals. Those who worked at home were
considerably less vulnerable than the others. There was a medium, significant
association between work location and password predictability.
E. FINDINGS ON DATA SENSITIVITY AND DATA IMPORTANCE
Respondents were asked to rate the sensitivity and importance of their data on a
scale of one to five. Data sensitivity refers to the degree to which embarrassment or
problems would result from the disclosure of the data. Data importance can be seen
as the value or utility of the data to the respondent. The importance of data is
assumed here to increase the degree of security desired. This analysis examines the
association of password characteristics with data ilportance and sensitivity. The null




Level of Data Importance
Level of Test Test Sign. Interpre- Refer
Variable Measure- Conducted Value Value -tation to
(1) -ment (2) (3) Appendix
Chosen Nominal Kruskal-W 12.98 .0114 NA - SS B-14
Password Nominal Kruskal-W 8.073 .0889 NA - SI B-15
Number Interval ANOVA .430 .787 NA - SI B-16
Work Nominal Kruskal-W 91.79 .0000 SA - SS B-15
Write Dichotomus Mann-Whit 55157 .0020 SA - SS B-17
Change Ordinal Spearman .1916 .0000 WA - SS B-18
Level of Data Sensitivity
Level of Test Test Sign. Interpre- Refer
Variable Measure- Conducted Value Value -tation to
-ment Appendix
Chosen Nominal Kruskal-W 7.264 .1226 NA - SS B-15
Password Nominal Kruskal-W 2.886 .5771 NA - SI B-14
Number Interval ANOVA 1.388 .236 NA - SI B-16
Work Nominal Kruskal-W 29.13 .0000 MA - SS B-14
Write Dichotomus Mann-Whit 64272 .8915 SA - SI B-17
Change Ordinal Spearman .1544 .0000 WA - SS B-18
LEGEND
1. Variables: Number - Number of characters in password.
Password - Password characteristics.
Chosen - How password was chosen.
Change - How often password is changed.
Write - Do you down your password.
Work - From where do you normally work when using a system.
2. Test values: The Kruskal-Wallis tests have critical a value of 13.277.
The ANOVA tests have critical values of 3.32.
3. Interpretation: NA - No association exists between the two variables
WA - A wea: association e::ists.
MA - A melium association e::ists.
SA - A stinia association e::ists.
SI - A statistically insignificant finding.
SS - A st,,tistically significant finding.
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The level of security should be commensurate with the importance of the data it
protects (Hoffman, 1977). Users are expected to choose passwords that will provide
the degree of security commensurate with the data they protect. Respondents were
asked to rate the importance and sensitivity of their data on a scale of one to five.
59 respondents felt their data was moderately to highly sensitive, while 474 respondents
felt their data was moderately to highly important.
A secure password is one that is relatively long, made up of random alphanumerics,
is easy to remember and difficult to guess. Once again, the trade-off of ease of use
and security must be optimized. This is difficult to achieve. Data sensitivity and
importance is expected to have some influence on how a password is chosen, the
number of characters in the password, the characteristics of the password, whether the
password is written down, how often is changed, and from where the user normally
works when using a system.
There were no associations between data importance or sensitivity and how a
password was chosen, password characteristics or the number of characters in a
password. The non-association can be explained by understanding that most students,
when issued a mainframe account, have little idea what they will be storing in their
accounts or it's importance. This can be related to the finding that few respondents
changed their password throughout their use of a mainframe account.
Data importance and work location were found to have a statistically stiorig
associated. Typically, if a user is working on an important data file. the place t w-wok
is somewhere private. unexpowcd to typica vulnerabilities.
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Whether a password is written down and the importance or sensitivity of the data
were found to be strongly related. A security conscious user with important and
sensitive data files will most likely not chose to write down his or her password for
fear of it being lost. Once written down the degree of security is compromised.
There was a weak association between the frequency of changing a password and
both data importance and sensitivity. This can be attributed to the premise that a
security conscious user will frequently change his or her password in order to reduce
the likelihood of it being guessed and increase the protection of his or her data files.
These findings indicate that several factors play an importance role in user-
generated password selection, memorability and predictability.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PASSWORDS AS AN EFFECIVE ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISM
This thesis pointed out that access control is required at various levels in order to
obtain a required level of security. At each level a certain amount of user
identification, authentication and authorization must be verified. Passwords were found
to be an effective mechanism for such. Traditional passwords, however, have some
inadequacies. Morris and Thompson's study revealed some of the inadequacies of user-
generated passwords in the pre-personal computer era. Some of these inadequacies
included passwords relatively short in character length and passwords made of some
type of meaningful detail to the user making them easy to remember. Passwords that
are easy to remember provide low levels of security. This thesis follows Morris and
Thompson's research in identifying the characteristics of user-generated passwords but
in personal computer era. The characteristics of user-generated passwords were
identified along with how these characteristics affect password selection, memorability
and predictability. A new area brought to light is how does the importance and
sensitivity of a user's data affect password selection, memorability and predictability.
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B. CHARACTERISTICS OF USER-GENERATED PASSWORDS
1. Pre-personal Computer Era Characteristics vs. Personal Computer Era
Characteristics.
This thesis has shown that the characteristics of user-generated password in
the personal computer era have not changed much from those characteristics in the pre-
personal computer era identified by Morris and Thompson (1979). User-generated
passwords of today still bear the characteristics of being made up of some type of
meaningful detail to the user, relatively short in length, made of
alphabetic/alphanumeric characters and typically written down on paper. In general,
they remain easy to remember and simple in structure. However, what has changed
is the users attitude toward computer security. The impetus of system security has
made the common user more privy to computer security requirements and more
receptive to organizational administrative and technical security controls/procedures.
2. Password Characteristics and Writing Down a Password.
Most users require memory aids to help recall (Menkus, 1988). The most
common type of memory aide is writing the password on paper. This violates the
basic tenet of password security. Typically, a password is written down if it is difficult
to remember (Avame, 1988). However, passwords are also written down simply out
of habit, from the perception that the password will not be used often enough to
remember or because of system change requirements are too demanding to remember
each password. This research showed that password memorability affects whether a
password is written down.
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3. Password Characteristics and Password Memorability.
This research revealed that several password characteristics affect password
memorability. The findings that support pevious research were: password
characteristics and how a password is chosen (meaningful detail, combination of
meaningful detail, pronounceable, etc,.) affect password memorability, the frequency
of changing a password, although increases the level of system security, hinders
memorability; the frecuency of logging on, may in many cases hinder security if the
password is not changed, enhances memorability. Most noteworthy is the finding that
password length was found not to have any affect on memorability. This can be
attributed to the advent of pronounceable passwords (mnemonics) such as
"2good2Btrue" and passphrases such as I Love Paris In The Springtime (phrase) -
ILPITST (password) (Menkus, 1988; Barton and Barton, 1984).
4. Password Characteristics and Password Guessing.
Results of this research show that password predictability is strongly affected
by the frequency of changing a password. As previous research purports, the greater
the frequency of change the greater the level of system security. Although previous
research suggested that passwords made of meaningful detail, relatively short in length
and simple in structure leads to ease of guessing the findings of this research did not
support this. A noteworthy finding that surprisingly goes against previous research is
writing down a password was found not to affect password predictability. Writing
down a password violates the basic tenet of password security in that the password is
something known, something secure but when it written down it becomes something
possessed that can be lost, placed in an insecure place or stolen.
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5. Password Characteristics and The Level of Data Importance and
Sensitivity.
Although previous research revealed very little on this area of interest, this
research shows that data importance and sensitivity does affect certain characteristics
of user-generated passwords. Hoffnan (1977) suggests that the level of security should
be commensurate with the importance of the resources it ptotects. Although, many
respondents for this research did note rate their data as very important nor sensitive,
the few that did were expected to exercise sound password security principles for
password selection and use. This study showed that how a password is chosen, the
number of characters in a password and password characteristics (alphabetic,
alphanumeric, ASCII, etc,.) were not affected by the level of data importance and
sensitivity. This finding ;:an be understood by noting that most respondents (students)
upon reporting to NPS and being asked to choose a password have no idea what or
the importance of what will be stored in their mainframe accounts. It can also be
noted that many, in the onset, are not very computer security conscious. Data
importance and sensitivity was found to strongly affect where a user will work when
using a system. A security conscious user working on sensitive and importance data
will typically work in a location that is private, less exposed to the threats of security.
This research also revealed that the frequency of changing a password is affected by
the level of data importance and sensitivity. A security conscious user will opt to




This study particularly shows that the characteristics of user-generated passwords in
the personal computer era have not changed drastically from those characteristics in the
pre-personal computer era. What has changed is the users awareness of the impetus
of computer security.
This study also show that certain characteristics of user-generated passwords affect
password selection, memorability, and predictability. Most importantly revealed was
the level of data importance and sensitivity affect password selection and predictability.
Following the recommendations of Cooper (1989), Morris and Thompson (1979) and
Pfleeger (1988), in order to improve the level of security/access control provided by
passwords they sould be:
1. longer in length;
2. made of meaningful detail to aide in remembering;
3. greater mix of characters such as ASCII characters;
4. frequently changed;
5. not written down.
Although, passwords are still widely used, confidence in their capabilities in
providing adequate security is decreasing. Applications of passwords as a security
mechanism have not advanced as rapidly as information system technology. Because
of this, the details of password systems applications and their effectiveness warrant
further research.
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Thesis Questionnaire - Computer Password Characteristics
Improving effective information system security is a continuing problem. Passwords are widely used
to control access to inlormation systems. The purpose of the questionnaire is to generate sa mple data
on the characteristics of user generated passwords at the NPS. I do not want to know your password,
only certain characteristics about it. The resulting data will be used to create a new form of passwords
that are difficult to guess.
NOTE:
Even if you arc not a computer user or do not use the computer frequently your response to this
questionnaire will still provide us with important information.
PART A: Personal Information
1. Age :
2. Sex ( circle one) Male Female
3. Curriculum ( Students )
or
Department ( Faculty ) :
PART B: Password Characteristics ( Pleasedo not reveal your password!!)
1. Do you use the NPS mainframe system ( circle one ) ?
No
Yes
If no, please return this questionnaire anyway. Even if you do not use the NPS system,
we appreciate completed returns to this survey.
If yes, please continue.
2. How many characters are in your password ?
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3. How did you choose your password ( circle one )?
A. A meaningful detail. ( e.g., name, date, street)
B. A combination of meaningful details. ( e.g., BiiU9M9, 4june63)
C. A pronoucable password. ( e.g., one4you, 2Bfree)
D. A random combination of characters. ( e.g., carS&, dUCk*? + )
E. Other (please specify).
4. What are the characteristics of your password ( circle one ) ?
A. Alphabetic ( e.g., abdc, ERTIS).
B. Numeric ( e.g., 1234, 5879).
C. Alphanumeric ( e.g., a3-d, fo67Yl).
D. ASCII ( e.g., cd!Yx, Acl + t6).
5. I-lave you ever had difficulty remembering your passwords ( circle one) ?
No
Yes
6. Very often, computer users find it convenient to write down their
password for one those unfortunate times when they forget it.
Do you also practice this ( circle one ) ?
Yes
No
If so, where do y)u write it down ( users manual, calendar
book, notebook, keyboard, on something in your wallet ) ?
where
7. How often did;do you change your password ( circle one ) ?
A. Never
B. Less than once a year
C. Up to three time,; a year
D. Four to six times a N"ear
E. About once every month
F. More than once a month
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8. Have you ever changed your password because you felt it had been
guessed by someone else( circle one ) ?
Yes
No
If so, what led you to believe it had been guessed ?
9. On a scale of one to five, how sensitive are your data ( what problems would result if revealed)
( circle one ) ?
1 2 3 4 5
I - .I I I
Non- Moderately Very
Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive
(nothing (mildly (embarrassing personally
to hide) embarrassing) or to the organization)
10. How important are your data ( how vital are your data ) ( circle one) ?
1 2 3 4 5I, I I I I
Non- Moderately I lighly
Vital Vital Vital
(not important, (thesis, research
would not miss, results)
life would go on)
11. When using a computer system, from where do you normally work ( circle one) ?
A. Private ofice at NPS
B. Home
C. Public terminal at NPS
D. Other ( please specif) )
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D. At least once a month
E. Several times a month
F. At least once a week
G. Several times a week
H. At least once a day
I. Several times a day
13. Do you use any non-NPS computer systems which require the use of a password ( circle one) ?
Yes
No
14. Do you use the same NPS password on non- NPS systems ( circle one) ?
Yes
No
Please place completed questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope
provided and return as soon as possible.
Thank you for your cooperation,




GROU I - DIFFREN Eg O, No
GROUP 2 - DIFFRE.J4 Ea i YES
P4,le4 Variance estimate 9 Separate Variance Estimate
Variable Number Standard Standard a F 2-tail ' t Degrees of 2-tell a t Degrees of 2-tail
of Casts Mean Devistion Errer a Valve Prob. a Value Freedom Prob. x Value Freedom Prob.
PASSNUL NUMBER OF CHARACTERS a a a
GROUP 1 775 5.6800 1.545 .055 a a a
a 1.1 .$94 a -.341 i56 .704 a -. 3g 102.33 .6 6
GROUP 2 a3 S.7470 1.472 .162 1 S s
------------------------------------- T-TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GROUP I - GUESSED E O: NO
GROUP 2 - GUESSED EQ 1: YES
4 Pooled Variance estimate a Separate Variance Estimate
Variable Number Standard Standard a F 2-tail : t Degrees of 2-til a t Degres of 2-tail
of Cases Mean Devi.Ion Error a Value Prob. 4 Value Freedom Prob. a Value Freedom Prob.
PASSNUM NUMBER OF CHARACTERS a a a
GROUP I 812 5.6761 I.4i6 .053 a I t
a 2.20 .000 a -1.27 848 .204 • -.39 8.5 .377
GROUP 2 38 6.0000 2.218 .360 a a a
... .. ... .. ... .. ... .. .. T.TEST-------------------------------------------
GROUP I - WRITTEN EOQ t NO
GROUP 2 - WRITTEN EQ 1: YES
u Pooled Variance estilate a Separate Variance Estimate
Variable Number Standard Standard a F 2-toll a t Dgrees of 2-tail a t Degrees of 2-tail
of Cases Mean DovIstlon Error a Value Prob. • Value Freedom Prob. a Value Freedom Prob.
PASSNUN NUMBER OF CHARACTERS a a a
GROUP I 459 5.6798 1.S54 .060 C a a
a 1.04 .737 a -.20 857 ,839 -.21 334.42 .838
GROUP 2 200 5.7050 1.513 .107 a a
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APPENDIX B-2
WRITTEN IS PASMORD WRITTEN DOWN? by PASSCIIAR PASSWORD CHARACTERISTICS
PASSCHAR Pase 1 of 1
Count I
Row Pct IALPHAVET NUMERIC ALPHANUM ASCII
Col Pct IIC ERIC Row
StdRes I 1 1 2 1 S I 4 I Total
WRITTEN . . w , . . .•. . .. •. . .
0 1 538 1 31 1 77 1 6 I 460
NO I 81.5 1 S.9% 1 11.7% I .1% 1 76.7%
'1 78.1% 1 3.0% 1 6S.3% 1100.0% 1
1 .4 1 .S I -1.4 1 .7 1
1 I ISI I 1 1 41 I 0 I 200
YES I 7S.5% 1 4.0% I 2O.53 1 .0% I 23.3%
1 21.91 I 17.0% 1 34.7 I .0 I
1 -.7 I -. 9 I 2.4 1 -1.2 1
Column 689 47 111 f 860
Total 80.1: 5.5% 13.7% .7 100.0:
Chi-Square Value DF Silhificance
Pearson 12.26351 3 .00053
Likelihood Ratio 12.12373 3 .00480
Mahnttl-Heenszel 4.78693 1 .02848
Minimum Exoected Frequency - 1.395
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 2 OF ( 25.0%)
Aporoximete
Statistic Value ASEI T-value Significance
Phi .11941 .00453 *1
Cromer's V .11941 .005iss %
Contingency Coefficient .11857 .00453 *1
Lambdo .
syrmttric .00000 .00000
with WRITTEN dependent .00000 .00000
with PASSCHAR dependent .00000 .00000
Goodman & Kruskel Tau t
with WRITTEN dependent .0142f .00118 .006S8 62
with PASSCKAR dependent .00430 .00486 .00102 s2
*I Pearson chi-square probability
82 basil on chi-square approximation
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APPENDIX B-3
WITTEN IS PASSWORD WRITTEN DOWH? by CHOICE NOW PASSWORD WAS CHOSEN
CHOICE Pest I of 1
Count I
Row Pct IMEANIGF COMB. I PRONOUNC RANDOM C OTHER
Col Pet 1UL ANINGFUL ABlE O14O. Row
Std Res I 1 1 2 1 $ 1 I 1 Total
WRITTEN
0 1 441 I 84 1 35 1 it 1 92 I 661
NO I 66.7% 1 12.71 I 5.0% I 1.7% 1 13.t% 1 76.8%
I 78.6% I 73.7% I 70.2% I $7. " I 76.7% I
1 .5 I -. 4 1 -.5 1 -.9 1 .0 I
1 ! 120 ! 0 0 14 81 28 1 200
YES I 60.0% 1 15.0% I 7.0% I 4.0n 1 14.0% 1 23.2%
I 21.4% I 26.10 1 29.8% 1 42.1% I 23.30 1
I -. I .7 1 .9 1 1.7 1 .0 1
Column 561 114 47 19 120 861
Total 65.2% 13.2% 5.5% 2.2% 13.9% 100.0%
Chi-Square Value OF Slgni
tic e nct
Pearson 6.60318 4 .IS#40
Likelihood Rotio 6.05353 4 .19519
Mentel-Hatnszti 1.40S45 1 .23581
Minimum Expected Frequency - 4.413
Cells with Expected Frequency < S - I OF 10 10.0%)
APoroxlmato
Statlstic Value ASEl I-value Significonce
Phi .08757 .15840 @1
Cromer's V .08757 .1580 
-1




with WITTEN dependent .00000 .00000
with CHOICE dependent .00000 .00000
Goodron S Kruskol Tau :
with WRITTEN dependent .0077 .00163 .15887 -2
with CHOICE dependent .00200 .00216 .14325 v2
a1 Pearson chi-%44are probability
$2 Dosed on chi-oquare opproxIetiflo
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APPENDIX B-4
-Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
CHANGES NOW OFTEN P.M. IS CNANGED
by DIFFREM DIFFICULTY REMEMBERING
Mean Rank Cases
421.18 776 DIFFRE4 - 0 NO
512.42 85 DIFFREM - I YES
959 Total
Corrected for ties
U N 2 2-Taled P
25343.5 42530.5 -4.5301 .0000
-....--Mann-Whitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
CHANGES HOW OFTEN P.. IS CHANGED
by IITTEN IS PASSWORD WITTEN DOWNN
Mean Rank Cases
4$0.54 $60 WRITTEN - 0 NO
430.36 200 WRITTEN - I YES
860 Totel
Corrected for ties
U N 2 2-Tailed P
65972.S 86072.5 -.0127 .9899
-M - enn-Whitney U - Nilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
LOGTIMES HOW OFTEN RESP. LOGS ON
by GUESSED WAS PASSWORD GUESSED?
Mean Rank Cases
414.66 801 GUESSED - 0 NO
524.34 37 GUESSED * I YES
838 Total
Corrected for ties
U W Z 2-Tailed P
10939.5 19400.5 -2.7243 .0064
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APPENDIX B-5
DIFFRE14 DIFFICULTY REMEMBERING by RITTEN IS PASSWCORD WRITTEN DOWN'
WdRITTEN Pao I of I
Count I
Row Pet IWO YES
Cal Pet I Row
Std Rts 0 1 1 I Total
DIFFREM - --- ...... ---
0 I 619 1 158 1 777
NO 1 79.7% I 20.3% I 90.3%
I 93. 1 79.0% 1
I . 1 -1.7 1
1 1 41 1 42 1 as
YES 1 .% 1 S10.6% 9.71
I 6.2% I 21.0 I
1 -2.8 1 5.2 1
Column 460 200 60
Total 76.7% 23.3% 100.0%
Chi-Sgusre Value DF Significance
Pearson 38.49327 1 .00000
Continuity Correction 36.916014 .00000
Likelihood Ratio S.00983 1 .00000
Nantel-Haanszol 38.44853 1 .00000
Hinimum Expected Frequency - 19.302
Approximate
Statistic Value ASEI T-value Significance
---- ----- ---- -
- ----- -
- -
Phi .21156 .00000 *1
Cramer's V .21156 .00000 -1
Contingency Coefficient .2068 .00000 *1
Lambda :
symmetric .003ss .03213 .10977
with DIFFREM dependent .00000 .00000
with WRITTEN dependent .00500 .04544 .10977
Goodman A Kruskol Tau i
with DIFFREH dependent .04476 .01703 .00000 *2
with HRITTEN dependent .04476 .01665 .00000 02
61 Pearson chi-square probability
02 Based on chi-square approximation
84
APPENDIX B-6
-..Mann-WhltntY U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum U Test
LOGTIMES HOW OFTEN RESP. LOGS ON
by WRITTEN IS PASSWORD WRITTEN DOWN?
Mean Ronk Cases
44.91 6SO WRITTEN . 0 NO
350.9S g98 WRITTEN - I YES
848 Total
Corrected for ties
U N Z 2-Toiled P
49273.0 . 69484.0 -4.8843 .0000
-
-- -- Mann-Whitney U - Nilcoxoi RInk Sum W Test
LOGTIMES HOW OFTEN RESP. LOGS ON
by DIFFREM DIFFICULTY REMEMBERING
Mean Rank Casts
430.22 766 DIFFREM - 0 WO
36S.1 91 DIFFREM - 1 YES
847 Total
Corrected for ties
U N Z 2-TsIlod P
262S .5 29580.S -2.3016 .0214
-Mann-Nhitney U - Wilcoxon Rank Sum W Test
CHANGES HOW OFTEN P.. IS CHANGED
by GUESSED WAS PASSWORD GUESSED?
Mean Rank Cases
414.40 812 GUESSED - 0 NO
662.75 38 GUESSED • I YES
850 Total
Corrected for tits
U N Z 2-Tailed P




DIFFREM DIFFICULTY REMfEIBERING by PASSCHAR PASSORD CARACTERISTICS
PASSCHAR Pate I of 1
Count 1
Row Pet IALPHAVET NUMERIC ALPHANUM ASCII
Cal Pet IIC ERIC Raw
Std Res I 1 2 1 3 I 4 I Total
DIFFREM
0 1 631 I 42 1 97 I 6 1 771
NO 1 81.3% I S.4% I 12.5% I .2% I 90.3%
I 91.7% I 89.4% I 82.2% I100.0% I
1 .4 1 -.1 I -.9 I .2 I
1 1 57 1 S I 21 1 0 1 83
YES I " .7% I 1.0% 1 2S.3% 1 .0% 9.7%
I 8.3% 1 10.1% I 17.8% I .0% 1
1 -1.2 I .2 1 2.8 1 -. 8 1
Column 88 47 118 6 859
Total 80.1% S.5% 13.7% .7% 100.0%
Chi-Square Value D: Significance
Pearson 11.13325 3 .01103
Likelihood Ratio 10.17997 3 .01710
Mentel-Heenszel 7.8542 1 .00506
Minimum Expected Frequency - .580
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 2 OF 8 ( 25.0%)
Approximste
Statistic Value ASEI T-value Significance
Phi .11385 .01103 al
Cromer's V .11385 .01103 -l
Continsency Coefficient .11311 .01103 al
Lambda :
synmetric .00000 .00000
with DIFFREM dependent .00000 .00000
with PASSCHAR dependent .00000 .00000
Goodman & Kruskel Tau :
with DIFFREM dependent .01296 .00920 .OiO a2
with PASSCHAR dependent .00842 .0064, .00008 02
-1 Pearson chi-square Probability
a2 Based on chi-square approximation
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APPENDIX B-8
DIFFRE4 DIFFICULTY RVEMENERING by CHOICE NO PASSWORD WAS CHOSEN
CHOICE Page I of I
Count I
Row Pct lIEANINF COM3. HE PROUNC RANDOM C OTIER
Cal Pct ILL ANINGFUL ABLE 00. Row
Std Res I 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 S I Total
DIFFRED -- -. *-- *
0 1 13 I 99 39 I 14 1 112 1 777
NO 1 66.0 I 12.7% I $.Or I 1.1% 1 14.4% 1 90.32
I 91.% 10 86.82 I 83.02 1 73.72 1 t3.3% I
1 .3 I -.4 1 -.5 I -,8 I .3 I
11 471 15 I I a S a 83
%TS 1 S4.6% 1 18.1% 1 9.6% 1 6.02 I 9.6% I 9.7%
I 8.4% 1 13.22 I 17.02 1 24.3% I 6.72 1
1 -1.0 1 1.2 1 1.6 I 2.3 I -1.1 I
Column S0 114 47 19 120 860
Total 65.1% 13.3% 5.5% 2.2% 14.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square Value DF Significance
Pearson 12.82940 4 .01214
Likelihood Ratio 10.64185 4 ..3090
Kenttl-Haensztl .24380 1 .62147
Minimum Expected Frequency - 1.834
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 2 OF 10 ( 20.02)
Approximate
Statistic Value ASE) T-value Significance
Phi .12214 .01214 01
Cramer's V .12214 .01214 01
Contingency Coefficient .12124 .01214 a)
Lambda :
symmetric .00000 .00000
with DIFFRE dependent .00000 .00000
with CHOICE dependent .00000 .00000
Goodman I Kruskl! Tou :
with DIFFREM dependent .01492 .01070 .01222 02
with CHOICE dependent .00291 .00244 .04046 92
NJ Pearson chi-square probability
82 Based en chi-square opprcxlmstion
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APPENDIX !
PASSS&W4 U f SU£ PAMIdR
D  hw DPF&RV4 DIFFICULTY Rvti'
DUtPRVM Pole 1 of 1
Count I
Row Pet 1ND YE1S
Cal Pet I low
Std Res Z 0 t I I Total
PASSSAO[ .. "
O 1 522 1 62 1 54
4 I 3,.4% 1 I.% I I4.9
I $4.3% I $9.9% I
I -. 11 . I
I 17 1 7 1 10'
YES 1 93.3% I 6.7% I I.lX
I5.7% 10.l I
Column 619 6P "S




P e rson .2 917
Contintuitv Correction 1.07712
Likelihood Ratio 1.6011 .22456
ntel-HnsZl7501 1






P hi~ t S .0 4 6 3 4 




with pAS.SU4F depndent .00000 .000
with OIFFREM dependent .00000 .00000
Goodman 2 Xrusksa 'Tu I .00215 .00303 .22S4 Q2
With PASSAKE dependent .0021S .00505 .22456 *2
With DIFFRES dependent ~.00 246a
al Pearson chi-square proballltV
mZ Based on cl-Iquare approxiestiOn
88
APPENDIX B-10
OUESSED WAS PASSWOD OUSSED? by WRITTEN 13 PASSOD WRITTEN DOWN?
WITTEN Paso I of I
Count I
Row Pet IN0 YES
Col Pet I Row
Std Res 1 0 I 1 I Total
GUESSED
0 1 i21 I itI I 312
NO I 76.5% 1 23.5% I 95.S%
9 5.2% 1 96.5% 1
I -.1 I .1 I
1 I 31 1 7 1 s8
YES I 1.6% I I8.4% I 4.S
I4.s% 1 3.5% 1
1 .3 1 -.4 I
Column 652 1t 50
Total 76.7% 23.3% 100.0%
Chi-Square Value OF Significance
Pearson .S2866 1 .4717
Continuity Correction .28171 1 .S5S
Likelihood Ratio .55662 1 .4S563
Mantel-Httnstzl .52804 1 .46743
Minimum Expected Frequency - 8.252
Approximate
Statistic Value ASE1 T-value Significarce
Phi .02404 .46717 al
Cromer's V .02494 .46717 01
Continsency Coefficient .02033 ..6717 ol
Lambda :
asymtric .0000 .00000
with GUESSED dependent .00000 .00000
with WRITTEN dependent .00000 .00000
Goodman 8 Kruskol Teu:
with GUESSED dependent .00062 .001s8 .4743 12
with WRITTEN dependent .00042 .00158 .46743 v2
21 Pearson chi-oquare probability
02 Based On chi-square approximation
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GUESSED kAS PASSWORD GUESSED? by PASSCHAR PASSWORD C)AAACTERISTICS
PASSCHAR Pale I of 1
Count I
Row Pet IALPHAIET NUERIC ALPHANUR ASCII
Col Pct IIC ERIC Row
Sto Res I I 1 2 31 1 I Total
GUESSED .... . - - -.- *- - -
0 1 656 I 46 I 106 I 4 1 812
NO I 80.8% I 5.7% 1 13.1: 1 .5% I 9S.5%
1 96.3% 1 97.9 I 91.4% I 66.7% 1
1 .2 1 .2 1 -.S I -.7 1
1 I 25 1 1 1 10 I 2 I 38
YtES I 6S.1% 1 2.6% 1 26.3% 1 5.3: 1 4.5%
1 3.7% I 2.1% 1 8.6% 1 33.3% I
I -1.0 1 -.2 I 2.1 1 3.3 I
Column 681 47 116 6 $so
Total 80.1% S.5% 13.6: .7% 100.0%
Chi-Square Value OF Significance
Pearson 18.00528 3 .00044
Likelihood Ratio 10.70256 3 .013 5
Mantel-Heenszel 9.S4842 1 4C0200
Minimum Expected Frequency - .268
Calls with Eyoectsd Frequency < S - 2 OF 8 (2s.0%)
Approximate
Statistic Value ASEI T-valuo Sinificance
Phi .14554 .00044 -1
Cromer's V .14554 .00044 *1
Contin ency Coefficient .14403 .00044 *1
Lambda
symmetric .00000 .00000
with GUESSED dependent .00000 .00000
with PASSCHAR dependent .00000 .00000
Goodman & Kruskel Tau:
with GUESSED dependent .02118 .01121 .00044 a2
with PASSCHAR dependent .00549 .00522 .00291 a2
I1 Pearson chi-suare prObability
a2 osed on hi-square approximation
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APPENDIX B-12
OIESSED WAS PASS.WORD GUESSED? by CHOICE HOW PASSWORD WA$ CHOSEN
CH4OICE Pas 1 of I
Count I
Row Pet IMEANINGF C0ONS. HE PRONOUNC RANDOM C OTHER
Col Pet IUL ANINOFUL ABLE Ono. Row
StV 4 es I 1 I 2 1 $ 1 4 1 5 1 Total
GUESSED
0 1 536 1 104 1 44 1 16 I 110 1 312
NO I 66.0% I 13.1% I S.4% I 2.0* I 13.5% I 95.5%
1 96.4% 1 94.6% 1 93.4% 1 84.2* 1 94.3% 1
1 .2 1 -. 11 -.11 -.S I -. 11
11 201 61 33 1 61 s8
YES I 52.6% I 15.$% 1 7.9* I 7.9% I 15.3* 1 4.5*
I 3.6 1 S.4% I 6.4 1 15.3* I S.2% 1
I -1.0 I .4 1 .6 1 2.3 I .4 I
Column 554 112 47 19 114 350
Total 6S.4% 13.2* S.5% 2.2* 15.6% 100.0%
Chi-Square Value OF Sisniflconce
Pearson 7.43s5s5 4 .11459
Likelihood Ratio S.27657 4 .2100S
Mantel-Heensztl 2.14214 1 .14325
Minimum Expected Frequency - .80
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 2 OF 10 ( 20.0%)
Approximate
Statistic Value ASEI T-value Slgniflcance
Phi .09353 .11S9 -1
Cromer's V .09353 .31459 d
Contingency Coefficient .09312 .11 9 ml
Lambda :
symetric .00000 .00000
with GUESSED dependent .00000 .00000
with C40ICE dependent .00000 .00000
Goodman 4 Kruskal Tau :
with GUESSED dependent .00875 .01017 .1108 02
with CHOICE dependent .00187 .00219 .17533 v2
a) Pearson chi-square probability
2 Blased on chi-square approximation
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GUESSED WAS PASSHORD GUESSED? by WORKLOC WHERE DO YOU WORK?
MORKLOC Post I of I
Count I
Row Pet IPRIVATE HME PURLIC T OTHER
Col Pet INPS OFFI EKINAL Rew
Std Res I 1 2 1 31 '6 1 Total
GUESSED *----
0 1 131 1 177 1 '87 1 is I s10
NO 1 16.2% 21.9% I o.1 1 1.9% 1 9S.5%
1 86.2' 96.7% 1 " g.0% 1 93.8% 1
1 -1.2 1 .2 1 .6 1 -. 1 1
1 I 21 1 6 I 10 1 1 ; 38
YES I SS.3S I lS.3 26.3 1 2.6% 1 4.S%
IS.$% 1 3.3% 1 2.0" I 6.3% 1
I . -.2 I -2.6 1 .3 1
Column 152 133 497 16 848
Total 17.9% 21.6% S8.6% 1.9% 100.0%
Chi-Square Value DF Significance
Pearson 38.75672 3 .00000
Llkelihood Ratio 29.97225 3 .00000
Man* Hiszel 28.68754 1 .00000
Minimum Expected Frequency - .717
Cells w th Expected Frequency < S - I OF 9 C12.S%)
Approximate
Statistic Value ASEI T-value Significance
Phi .21378 .00000 -1
Cramer*s V .21378 .00000 -1
Contingency Coefficient .20906 .00000 81
Lambda :
symmetric .02828 .01397 1.98022
with GUESSED dependent .00000 .00000
with NORKLOC dependent .03134 .01561 1.98022
Goodman I Kruskol Tou :
with GUESSED dependent .04570 .01923 .00000 *2
with WORKLOC dependent .0200S .00778 .00000 v2
01 Pearson chi-square Probability





by COICE HOW PASSWORD WAS CHOSEN
Mean Rink Cals
411.94 554 CHOICE x I MEANINGFUI.
456.83 112 CHOICE * 2 COMB. IEAm!HGFUL
417.1S 46 CHOICE . I PROINOUNCABLE
599.66 19 CHOICE . RANDOM COHO.
429.38 117 CHOICE . 5 OTHER
848 Total
Cvrrecttd for ties
Casts Chi-Square Sgnificasnce Chi-square Significance
048 12.9778 .0114 13.9446 .0075
-Kruskal-wallls 1-Way Anovo
PASSCHAR PASSWORD CHARACTERISTICS
by DATASENS DATA SENSITIVITY
Mean Rank Cases
41t.07 697 DATASENS - I NONSENSITIVE
441.80 94 DATASENS x 2
472.78 43 DATASENS - 3 MODERATELY SENSITIVE
440.00 9 DATASENS - 4
48f.00 6 DATASENS * S VERY SENSITIVE
849 Total
Corrected for tits
Casts Chi-Square SliSnificnce Chi-Squsre significance
849 2.8861 .5771 5.9977 .1993
-Kruskal-Wlllls I-Wey Anova
IORKLOC WHERE Do YOU WORK!
by DATASENS DATA SENSITIVITY
Mean Rank Cases
441.02 699 DATASENS - I NONSENS1TIVE
386.86 94 DATASENS - 2
381.87 43 DATAStNS - I MODERATELY SENSITIVE
154.06 9 DATASENS - 4
102.7t 7 DATASENS - 5 VERY SENSITIVE
852 Total
Corrected for ties
Cases Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance





by CHOICE HOW PASSWRD WAS CHOSEN
Mean Ronk Cases
416.87 56 CHOICE 1 HEINI4GFUL
459.75 112 CHOICE - 2 COMS. MEANIwG.FUL
00.9S 47 CHOICE - 5 PRONOUNCABLE
537.13 19 CHOICE - 4 RANDOM COMBO.
425.4.7 116 CHOICE • S OTHER
*50 Total
Corrected for ties
Cases Chi-Square Significance Chl-Square Sisnificance
850 7.2645 .126 16.2457 .0027
-Kruskl-Wallls I-Way Anovs
PASSCHAR PASSWORD CHARACTERISTICS
by DATAVITL DATA IMPORTANCE
Mean Rank Cases
404.99 306 DATAVI7L - I HONVITAL
397.26 138 DATAVITL - 2
431.30 205 DA7AVITL - 3 MODERATELY VITAL
470.19 71 DATAVIlL *
456.44 127 DAIAVIIL - S VERY VITAL
847 Tota1
Corrected for tits
Casts Cl-Sqtuare SgnIlficance Cni-Squert Significance
847 8.07131 .088, 16.6678 .0022
-Krukasl-Wallis I-Way Anove
HORKLOC HIRE DO YOU WORK?
by DATAVITL DATA IMPORTANCE
Mean Rank Casts
417.05 306 DATAVITL - I HONVITAL
430.33 140 DAIAVITL - 2
438.61 204 DATAVITL - 3 MODERATELY VITAL.
370.48 71 DATAVITL * 4
255.47 128 DAIAVIIL - 5 VERY VITAL
841 Total
Corrected for ties
Costs Cli-Snuart Slgnlficance ChI-Sculrt Significanet
$0 91.7949 .0000 116.6784 .0000
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APPENDIX B-16
A NA L Y$1S O F V A RI A NCE . .
PASSNUM N"NER OF CH4ARACTERS
by DATASENS DATA SENSITIVITY
Sum of mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares OF Square F of F
Main Effects 12.973 4 3.243 1.388 .236
DATASENS 12.973 4 3.203 1.388 .236
Explained 12.973 4 3.243 1.38 .236
Residual 1971.524 S'4 2.336
Total 1"*4.497 848 2.340
997 cases were Processed.
Ar N A LYSI O 30F V A R IA N CE
PASSNUM N"IER OF C)4ARACTERS
by DATAVITL DATA IWORUTNCE
Sumr: of SMea'n F SIB
Source of Variation $quars O qoa F o
Main Effects 4.048 4 1 .012 .430 .787
DATAVITL 4.048 4 1.012 .430 .787
Explained 4.048 4 1.012 .430 .787
Residual 1980.245 042 2.3S2
Total 1984.293 846 2.345
997 cases ware Processed.
150 eases (15.0 Pct) were missing.
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APPENDIX B-17
- - - --- ann-Whitney U - Wilccxon Rank Sum W Test
DATASEWS DATA SENSITIVITY
by GUESSED WAS PASSWORD GUESSED!
Peio Rank Cases
41.26 810 GUESSED * 0 NO
S49.64 37 GUESSED - 1 YES
347 Total
Corrected for ties
U W Z 2-Tailed P
10336.S 20.36.S -4.7827 .0000
-- - MannWhitney U - Wilcox n Rink Sue k Test
DATASENS DATA SENSITIVITY
by WRITTEN IS PASSWORD WRITTEN DOWN?
Mean Rank Cases
425.92 652 WRITTEN - 0 NO
424.11 18 WRITTEN - I YES
850 Total
Corrected for ties
U W 2 2-Tailed P
64272.0 83973.0 -.136G .8915
-
- - Mann-Whtney U - Wilcoxor Rank Sum W Test
DATAVITL DATA IMPCRTANCE
by WRITTEN IS PASSWORD WRITTEN DOWN?
Mean Rink Cases
438.27 651 WRITTEN - 0 NO
178.9 197 WRITTEN - I YES
848 Total
Corrected for ties
U W z 2-Tailea P






*-is PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CAW40T BE COMPUTED.




-.- IS PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT VE COMPUTED.
97
LIST OF REFERENCES
Ahituv, N., Lapid, Y. and Neumann, S. (1987), "Verifying the Authentication of
an Information System User," Computers and Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 152-157.
Avarne, S. (1988), "How to Find Out a Password," Data Processing &
Communication Security, Vol. 12, No. 2, (Spring, 1988), pp.16-17.
Barton, B. F. and Barton, M. S. (1984), "User-Friendly Password Methods for
Computer-Mediated Information Systems," Computers and Security, Vol. 3, No. 3,
(1988), pp 186-195.
Blalock, H. M. Social Statistics, Revised ed., McGraw Hill Inc., New York, NY,
1979.
Cooper, J. A. (1989), Computer an Communications Security, Strategies for the
1990's, McGraw Hill Inc., New York, NY, 1989.
Durr, M and Gibbs, M. (1989), "Peeling Back the Layers," Byte June 1989, pp.
258-259.
Fisher, R. P., (1984), Information Systems Security, Prentice- Hall Inc., New York,
NY., 1984.
Hoffer, J. A. and Straub, D. W., (1989), "The 9 to 5 Underground: Are you Policing
Computer Crimes," Sloan Management Review, Summer 1989, pp. 35-43.
Hoffman, L. J., Modem Methods for Computer Security and Privacy, Prentice-Hall
Press, New York, NY., 1977.
Hsiao, D. K., Computer Security, Academic Press, New York, NY., 1979.
Kochanski, M. (1989), "How safe is it?," Byte, June 1989, pp. 257-264.
Kurzban, S., (1983), "A Dozen Gross 'MythConceptions' about Infomnation
Processing," Security, IFIP, pp. 15-25, 1983.
Mansfield, E., Statistics for Business md Economics, 2nd Ed.. W. W. Norton 1nd




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
3. Department Chairman, Code AS 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
4. Prof. William J. Haga, Code AS/Hg 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
5. Prof. Moshe Zviran, Code AS/Zv 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
6. Computer Technology Curricular Office, Code 37 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
7. Director Computer Center, Code 0141 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000




Morris, R. and Thompson, K. (1979), "Password Security: A Case History,"
Communications of the ACM, Vol. 22, No. 11, pp. 594-597.
Menkus, B. (1980), "Understanding the Use of Passwords," Computers and Security,
Vol 7, No. 2, (April 1988), pp. 132-136.
Norusis, M. J., SPSS-X Introductory Statistics Guide for Release 3. SPSS Inc.,
Chicago, I1., 1988.
Panns, R. and Herschberg, I. S. (1987), "Computer Security: The Long Road
Ahead," Computers and Security, Vol. 6, No. 5, (1987), PP. 403-416.
Parker, D.B. and Nycum, S. H. (1984), "Computer Crime", Communications of the
ACM, Vol. 22, No. 4, (1984), pp. 313-315.
Porter, J. H. and Hamm, R. J., Statistics: Applications for the Behavioral Sciences,
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Monterey, CA, 1986.
Porter, S. N. (1982), "A Password Extension for Human Factors," Computers and
Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, (1982), pp. 54-56.
Rash, W. (1989), "In Depth Security," Byte, June 1989, pp. 254.
Siegel, S. and Castellan, J. N., Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences,
2nd Ed., McGraw Hill Inc., New York, NY., 1988.
Smith, S. L. (1987), "Authenticating Users by Word Association," Computers and
Security, Vol. 6, No. 6, (1987), pp. 464-470.
Ware, W. H. (1984), "Information System Security and Privacy," Communications
of the ACM, Vol. 27, No. 4, (1984), pp. 315-321.
Wood, H. (1977), "The Use of Passwords for Controlled Access to Computer
Resources," Institute for Computer Science and Technology to Computer Resources,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977.
Woods, C. C. (1983), "Effective Information System Security with Password
Controls," Computers and Security, Vol. 2 No. 1, (1983), pp. 5-10.
99
